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SUMMARY 
A flight simulation experiment was performed to determine 
the effectiveness of synthesized voice approach callouts for air 
transport operations. Flight deck data was first collected on 
scheduled air carrier operations to describe existing pilot-not-
flying callout procedures in the flight context and to document 
the types and amounts of other auditory cockpit information dur-
ing different types of air carrier operations. A flight simula-
tion scenario for a wide-body jet transport airline training 
simulator was developed in collaboration with a major U.S Air 
Carrier and flown by three-man crews of qualified line pilots as 
part of their normally scheduled recurrent training. Each crew 
flew half their approaches using the experimental synthesized 
voice approach callout system (SYNCALL) and the other half using 
the company Pilot-not-Flying approach callout procedures (PNF). 
Airspeed and sink rate performance was better with the SYNCALL 
system than with the PNF system for non-precision approaches. 
For the One-Engine Approach, for which SYNC ALL made inappropriate 
deviation callouts, airspeed performance was worse with SYNCALL 
than with PNF. Reliability of normal altitude approach callouts 
was comparable for PNF on the line and in the simulator and for 
SYNCALL in the simulator. However, SYNCALL was more reliable 
than PNF for making deviation approach callouts in. the simulator. 
pilots generally favored the concept of SYNCALL and judged it 
more reliable than PNF callouts. They suggested modifications 
before it would be appropriate for operational use. It was con-
cluded that SYNCALL improved flight performance for non-precision 
approaches, and that a SYNCALL system should make deviation cal-
louts only. For consistency, it is recommended that the modes of 
the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) be incorporated into a 
SYNCALL system. The detrimental effects on performance associat-
ed with inappropriate deviation callouts led to the further con-
clusion that such callouts should be designed out of the system. 
Finally, the results and conclusions of the experiment are used 
to develop suggestions for improvements to SYNCALL before further 
testing. 
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SYNTHESIZED VOICE APPROACH CALLOUTS FOR AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS 
Carol A. Simpson 
INTRODUCTION 
The final approach and landing segment of jet transport 
operations requires exact and constant awareness by the crew of 
altitude and position. This information is currently provided in 
visual form by the flight instruments and in spoken form by cal-
louts made by whichever pilot is not actively flying the ap-
proach. Airline procedures call for the pilot-not-flying to moni-
tor the performance of the pilot-flying by scanning the flight 
instruments and calling out specific altitudes and any observed 
deviations outside company-prescribed tolerances. Prior to the 
point where the pilot-flying expects to be able to see the run-
way, one pilot (depending on the airline) begins looking outside 
and reports when the runway is in sight. The other pilot focuses 
visually inside the cockpit and monitors the flight ·instruments. 
This pilot and, in some cases, the flight engineer are then 
responsible for making the necessary approach callouts. The 
specific set of caliouts used and assignment of responsibility 
for making the callouts to pilot-not-flying and/or to the flight 
engineer varies somewhat across air carriers. Despite some 
differences in the choice of callouts, the intended functions of 
the callouts are common to all carriers. These are 1) to reduce 
the visual workload for the pilot-flying, 2) to keep all three 
crewmembers aware of aircraft altitude and position, and 3) in 
the case of callouts that require acknowledgment from the pilot-
flying, to serve as a check for incapacitation of the pilot-
flying. 
In the discussion that follows, the term "pilot-not-flying 
callouts" will stand for all of the approach callouts regardless 
of which crew member is actually expected to make particular cal-
louts. This will permit discussion of the approach callouts 
themselves without referring to the differences among air car-
riers. 
A number of air carrier approach and landing accidents during 
low or impaired visibility have been associated with the absence 
of approach callouts. This fact at first suggests that the ab-
sence of altitude and deviation callouts may have contributed to 
inadvertent flight into terrain during these approaches. Such a 
conclusion was drawn by the National Transportation Safety Board 
in a special study on flight crew coordination procedures in ac-
cidents during air carrier instrument landing system approaches. 
(1) However, due to the absence of data on callout performance 
for successful approaches made during the same period (1970-1975) 
no test of this suggested relationship of cause and effect can be 
performed. 
Another untestable post hoc hypothesis is that increased 
workload during the approaches that terminated in accidents 
prevented the pilot-not-flying from making the callouts. While 
neither hypothesis can be directly tested, it is reasonable to 
ask whether the current procedure can be improved, especially 
when unexpected events cause a high workload in the cockpit. One 
alternative medium for information transfer would be a speech 
synthesizer which could receive raw data from the onboard central 
air data computers and automatically make the callouts at ap-
propriate times during the approach. 
OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of the present study was to compare a pilot-not-
flying (PNF) approach callout system to a system composed of PNF 
callouts augmented by an automatic synthesized voice callout sys-
tem. A full task flight simulation experiment was conducted to 
determine if one or the other system transfers altitude and devi-
ation information more reliably than the other and/or results in 
better flight performance by the pilot-flying. 
EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH 
This objective was accomplished by a collaborative effort 
between American Airlines Flight Academy and NASA Ames Man Vehi-
cle Systems Research Division. A DC-10 flight training simulator 
was flown during normal flight training using crews as assigned 
but on a strictly voluntary basis. All pilots offered the oppor-
tunity to participate did so. Twenty 3-man crews flew several 
types of approaches half with the standard callout procedures and 
half with a synthesized voice callout system (SYNCALL). Measure-
ments were made of flight performance, callout reliability, cal-
lout interference with other audio events, and pilot ratings of 
callouts on several scales. 
The experimental approach actually incorporated two types of 
data collection: 1) Flight Deck data collection and 2) data col-
lection during the formal flight simulator experiment comparing 
pilot-not-flying callouts to SYNCALL callouts. 
2 
FLIGHT DECK DATA COLLECTION 
Design of an automatic approach callout system and measure-
ment of the effectiveness of approach callouts in the flight con-
text in a way that is meaningful for airline flight operations 
requires some degree of familiarity with flight operations and 
the complex environment in which those operations take place. 
The author did not at the onset of the project, have the re-
quisite familiarity with multi-engine jet transport airline 
operations. Thus the first phase of the project was a program of 
flight deck observation by the author. The necessary authoriza-
tions from the air carrier and the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) were issued for "the purpose of observing flight crew 
activity to gain insights into the potential uses and pitfalls 
for synthesized speech." 
A systematic approach was taken for the flight deck observa-
tion program. The program goals were: 
1) To gain over-all familiarity with airline flight opera-
tions and the tasks performed during each phase of the flight by 
each crew member and to observe interactions among crew members, 
2) To collect data on time spent with voice communications 
with ATC as a function of phase of flight. Tnis was needed in 
order to assess the possibility of simultaneous voice messages 
from ATC and a synthesized voice callout system. 
3) To collect data on the frequency of and type of oc-
currences of simultaneous or overlapping voice messages from mUl-
tiple sources and to observe the methods used by the crew to cope 
with such situations; 
4) To become familiar with the existing pilot-not-flying ap-
proach callout procedures as a function of type of weather, type 
of approach, and pilot flying; 
5) To observe any instances in which pilot-not-flying cal-
louts were not made to determine possible reasons for each such 
instan~e, e.g. distraction from ATC, higher than normal or dif-
ferent from normal workload for the pilot-not-flying, intentional 
omission of certain callouts due to approach circumstances, etc; 
6) To collect the above data for a cross section of type of 
flight operations long, cross-continental, short haul, over-
water, night, day, large or small airport, high or low traffic 
density, type of approach; 
7) To have an opportunity to observe instances of the crew 
performing other than normal operations. Since abnormal or emer-
gency operations are extremely rare, a large number of observa-
tion flights was needed in order to obtain any such instances. 
8) To collect crew preferences for the possible uses of syn-
thesized speech in the cockpit while they were in the actual 
cockpit environment. 1 
1. Such conversations were conducted only during the cruise 
3 
Approach ~ Landing Procedures 
The following narrative description of crew approach and 
landing procedures is based on the author's experience and data 
collected for a sample of flights or "trip legs" during which 
scheduled air carrier operations were observed from the "jump 
seat" directly behind the captain's seat. Table 1 lists the 
types of aircraft and flight operations that were observed. The 
flight crew was observed to be a close-knit team with each member 
performing certain functions. Throughout the approach the crew 
members must use a certain amount of judgment in planning when to 
carry out their tasks so as to complement rather than interfere 
with each other. The approach callouts are only a part of the 
procedures carried out during the approach t~ landing and as such 
will be described in this context. 
TABLE 1 • TYPES OF 
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS 
NUMBER OF DIFFERENT 
AIRCRAFT TYPES: 
727 30 
707 16 
DC-10 18 
747 8 
TIME OF DAY: 
DAY 51 
NIGHT 21 
FLIGHT OPERATIONS OBSERVED 
AIRPORTS 
72 
24 
TRIP DURATION: 
< 1 HR 5 
1 
-
2 HRS 21 
2 
- 3 HRS 13 
3 - 4 HRS 19 
> 4 HRS 14 
TYPE OF OPERATION: 
DOMESTIC PASSENGER 
OVERwATER PASSENGER 
DOMESTIC FREIGHT 
66 
2 
4 
----------------------------------------------------------------
Throughout the entire flight the captain and the first off-
icer are responsible for flying the aircraft with the captain 
having final decision-making authority as pilot-in-command. Typi-
cally, the. captain and first officer alternate "legs" actually 
flying the aircraft so that each pilot receives time at the 
flight controls. So, for a given approach one of the pilots will 
fly the aircraft, either manually or using one of several autopi-
lot modes. The other pilot communicates by voice over the radio 
with the ground-based air traffic controllers. 
segment of the flight and only at the convenience of the crew and 
with the Captain's permission. Ongoing conversations were halted 
immediately, often in mid-sentence; whenever any flight duty, 
such as communication with ATC, was required. 
4 
The Flight engineer, in addition to his primary responsibili-
ties as the aircraft systems operator, is usually delegated addi-
tional monitoring and communications responsibilities. During 
Take-Off and Landing he serves as a back~up for the two pilots to 
double-check that checklist items are performed. 
The flight engineer's back-up function is particularly impor-
tant during the approach to landing since the pilots are busy 
with frequent changes in ATC communications and navigation fre-
quencies, and aircraft heading, airspeed, and altitude. Table 2 
lists the observed average numbers of such changes that were 
given to the crew by ATC per descent and approach. In addition 
to complying with instructions from ATC, the pilots must make 
other changes in heading, altitude, airspeed, and aircraft confi-· 
guration in order to follow their desired flight route to runway 
touchdown. 
TABLE 2. MEAN NUMBERS OF ATC CHANGES DURING 
DESC8NT & APPROACH FOR 30 SCHEDULED AIR CARRIER 
FLIGHTS ACROSS FOUR AIRCRAFT TYPES AND SIXTEEN AIRPORTS 
Segment Time (Beginning of Descent to Landing) (min) 
Number of Heading Changes 
Number of Altitude Changes 
Number of Frequency Changes 
Number of Speed Changes 
TOTAL Number of Changes 
mean 
24.0 
2.6 
5.3 
4. 1 
1.8 
13.8 
sd 
7.5 
1.8 
1.3 
1.1 
1 .7 
Preparation for the approach begins while still at cruise al-
titude. The flight engineer tunes his communications radio to 
the frequency on which the Automatic Terminal Information Service 
(ATIS) broadcast is being transmitted. He copies down the infor-
mation on winds, runways in use, and approaches to be expected. 
He then re-copies the information onto a prepared form and passes 
it forward to the pilots. Once the pilots have this information, 
they can plan the approach. They select the appropriate approach 
charts and review the flight profile in terms of altitudes, navi-
gational fixes, distances, headings, navigational aid frequen-
cies, and missed approach procedures. The captain gives any spe-
cial instructions warranted by the particular conditions. 
The approach segment, which has been defined here as starting 
when the ATC approach controller clears the aircraft for the ap-
proach, usually starts at approximately 3000 feet Above Field 
Level (AFL) and includes interception of the final approach 
course, passage over a final approach fix, and descent down the 
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desired glidepath to touchdown on the runway. All of the Ap-
proach Callouts are made during this segment, which lasts some 8 
to 10 minutes. Thus this segment was chosen for the comparative 
study of the two callout systems. 
Figure 1 is a reproduction of the page in the airline's 
flight manual describing the approach callouts. During the 
course of the approach the pilot-flying must intercept the final 
approach course and descend to the runway touchdown point at the 
necessary rate so as to maintain the desired glidepath. Tracking 
of the glidepath may be accomplished either by reference to raw 
data such as time, speed, and rate of descent or by reference to 
a ground-transmitted glideslope signal. If the latter is avail-
able, the approach is classified as a precision approach, and the 
approach can be flown to a relatively lower altitude and with 
less visibility than is possible without a glideslope signal. If 
a glideslope signal is not available, then tha~ approach is 
called a non-precision approach. Either type o~ approach can be 
flown using what is called "raw data" or ~";ing command data from 
a "Flight Director". The data provided dir\:.ctly by the flight 
instruments is called "raw data". The Fright Director, on the 
other hand, processes the raw data and provides maneuvering com-
mands via steer and pitch bars or needles or similar display, 
depending on the aircraft. With a Flight Director, the pilot 
flies according to the steer and pich commands on the display. 
For either type of approach, there is a minimum altitude to 
which the aircraft is per~itted to descend without having the 
runway in sight. In the United States, this is called Minimum 
Descent Altitude (MDA) for non-precij~on approaches and Decision 
Height (DH) for precision approaches. If the runway is in sight 
by the time the minimum altitude is reached and if the pilot-
flying judges that the landing is assured, then the approach is 
continued to landing (or go-around, should the situation subse-
quently become unfavorable for landing). There is a further de-
tail in the case of non-precision approaches, tllose using an MDA. 
For these there is also a Missed Approach Point (MAP) at a speci-
fied point on the final approach course. I(~',at MDA the runway is 
still not in sight, the aircraft can be, flown at MDA altitude un-
til the MAP is reached, descending to landing if the runway is 
acquired visually. Upon reaching the MAP with no runway in 
sight, the crew makes a go-around. 
During the approach the pilot-not-flying monitors the ap-
proach, operates the slats, flaps, and landing gear as desired by 
the pilot-flying, and prepares mentally to make a go-around if 
necessary. He makes the normal approach callouts applicable to 
the particular type of approach being flown, as indicated in Fig-
ure 1. An1, if deviations occur in airspeed, sink rate, localiz-
er, or glideslope, he calls these to the attention of the pilot-
flying. 
The Flight Engineer finishes the "Before Landing Checklist" 
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dA NORMAL PROCEDURES Section 3 
DC-1O Operating Manual 
STANDARD CALLOUTS - ALL DESCENTS, APPROACHES AND LANDINGS 
...4--
/" "--Transition Ll'wl • 
'*-
FlO CALLOUTS 
Page 63 
2-27-76 
\
'11.000' MSt. (FL 110 if Transition Level is at or brlow) 
FAF ~------------------------------------, 
I~_~ *"!..P:..:IL~O:..!T..!.N~O:..!T...!F...!L:...!Y~IN~G~CA=LL:.:O~U~T~S 
(if making ILS approach) r "'-1/ M GIS interception I . ~ 1,000' AFL - Verbally Verify When Flaps at Landing Setting 
FGS Mode Annunciators ~ 
•. ......... 500' AFL, Airspeed ± Approach Speed 
Final Approach Fix and· ......... and Descent Rate 
AFL Crossing Altitude "'- " ~ 400'AFL 
'''-.( 300' AFL 
CAPTAIN CALLOUTS 'Q. 200' AFL 50' Radio Altimeter 
.L I DH To Touchdown At 
~ I 10' Increments 
""'-~------------~---~---~ ~ 
Pilot Not Flying 
Airspeed - With Landing Flaps anytime speed varies from approach speed by more than ±5 Kts. 
Rate of Descent - When Below: If Descent Rate Exceeds: 
2,000' . 2,000 FPM 
1,000' 1,000 FPM 
300' 700 FPM 
During Cat II Approaches FlO will make all callouts from 500' to landing. including Airspeed or Descent Rate if 
not within limits. 
LOC and GS indication Callout-On final, anytime any crewmember observes LOC displa(;~ll1ent greater than 1/3 
dot andlor GIS displacement greater than I dot, other pilot will acknowledge 
NOTES: this deviation. 
1. Use the Captain's or F/O's altimeter for all altitude callouts. except for the CAT II approach, in which case 
use the radio altimeter for the 300' callout and remaining callouts below 300' to touchdown. 
2. When executing a non-precision approach, the pilot not flying will call out "100' ABOVE MDA," MDA 
and MAP. 
3. Callouts not applicable on non-precision or visual approaches should be disregarded. 
• For Transition Level outside U.S. refer to avigation charts. 
FIE MONITORING 
In addition to his normal monitoring of engine instruments and FIE panel, the FIE will monitor flight 
instruments, especially altitude and airspeed. He will assist in maintaining a watch for traffic and other factors 
that could adversely affect safety. He will monitor HSI and AD! navigation indications and call out any 
discrepancies between the two instruments. On final. call out LOC displacement anytime it is greater than 1/3 
dot andlor GIS displacement anytime it is greater than I dot. 
Figur~ 1. - Anerican Airlines DC-1Q ~~pro3ch Callout Proc~jures, 
Flight ~3nual, page 63, 2-27-76. Reprinted by per~ission. 
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to ensure that all systems are set for landing or, where ap-
propriate, armed for go-around. He assists the Pilot-not-Flying 
with the monitoring of the approach. 
Since this entire segment lasts only 'some 8 to 10 minutes, it 
should be apparent that there is a fair amount of intra-cockpit 
voice communication that occurs in a short time, along with the 
ATC communications. 
~ Qommunications Workload ~ fhase Qf Flight 
It was found that the amount of time used by the crew to com-
municate with ATC varied as a function of phase of flight. 
Correspondingly, so did the number of ATC transactions (consist-
ing of one exchange between pilot and controller of either 1) pi-
lot transmission to controller + controller acknowledgement or 
other response, or 2) controller transmission to pilot + pilot 
acknowledgement or other response). Table 3 lists this data. 
TABLE 3. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL VOICE COMMUNICATIONS WORKLOAD 
BY PHASE OF FLIGHT. MEANS FOR 39 TRIPS. STANDARD 
DEVIATIONS IN PARENTHESES. 
PHASE OF FLIGHT 
TAXI CLIMB CRUISE DESCENT TAXI TOTAL 
SEGMENT 
DURATION 
(S.D.) 
(min) 19.68 24.77 86.68 25.61 
(12.33) (11.48) (71.55) (11.72) 
TIME TALKING/ 
LISTENING (min) 
(S.D.) 
PERCENT OF TIME 
SPENT W/ ATC 
NO. OF ATC 
TRANSCACTIONS 
(S.D.) 
MEAN TIME PER 
TRANSACTION (s) 
(S.D.) 
1 .45 
(1.63) 
7 % 
9.25 
(4.09) 
8.65 
(6.00) 
2.83 
(1.44) 
1 1 % 
4.30 
(3.47) 
5 % 
17.29 21.81 
(8.34) (17.31) 
8.86 12.55 
(3.21) (6.48) 
3.9J 
(1.88) 
20.89 
(8.99) 
1 1 .84 
(5.09) 
5.58 
(3.66) 
0.47 
(0.50) 
8 % 
2.87 
(2.60) 
9.06 
(6.42) 
163.41 
(76.41) 
13.58 
(5.50) 
8 % 
70.05 
(23.55) 
1 1 .70 
(3.46 ) 
----------------------------------------------------------------
Overlapping Audio Signals ~ Voice Communications 
The types of situations in which overlapping of audio signals 
and/or speech communications occurred can be classified as either 
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routine or unexpected. That is, certain combinations of overlap-
ping audio occur on nearly every flight, necessitating either 
formal or informal crew procedures for handling them. Others oc-
cur occasionally by chance and must be handled by the crew on an 
event-specific and unique basis. 
Many of the routine pairs of overlapping audio signals in-
volve concurrent voice communications between 1) pilot-not-flying 
and ATC and 2) Flight Engineer and AIRINC (Aeronautical Radio In-
corporated) or Company. Some examples are: 1) ATC Push-back or 
Taxi Clearance and Flight Engineer Time Out Report, 2) Initial 
ATC transaction with Departure Control and Flight Engineer's Time 
Off and Load Report, 3) Initial Descent from Cruise Clearance and 
FIE Monitor the ATIS, 4) Outer Marker Passage with Captain's Cal-
lout and Pilot-not-Flying contact Tower. Except for the last 
pair, the need for concurrent audio signals is handled routinely 
by assigning the ATC communications tasks to the Pilot-nct-Flying 
and the AIRINC and Company Communications tasks to the Flight En-
gineer. However, in the case of the Outer Marker Callout by the 
Captain and the Pilot-not-Flying ATC call to the Tower, it hap-
pens that 50% of the flights involve the Captain and the Pilot-
not-Flying being one and the same individual. This individual 
must then sequence the two voice messages, with the result that 
one or the other may be late. When the First-Officer is the 
Pilot-not-Flying, he may be calling the Tower at the same time as 
the Captain is making the Outer Marker Callout, with the result 
that he may not verbally process the callout; The Captain can and 
was observed to delay the callout until after contact with the 
tower had been established (duration of approx 8 s during which 
the aircraft descends another 136 feet at, say 1000 FPM). Thus, 
the First Officer as pilot-flying on these occasions will see an 
altimeter reading th~t could be as much as 100fe~t different 
from that which the Captain as pilot-not-flying calls out. Types 
of overlapping auditory messages that occurred by chance included 
SELCAL or CABIN CALL bells or chimes overlapping with ATC commun-
ications or with crew cockpit voice communications. The Gear 
Warning Horn, which was observed to trigger several times per 
flight inappropriately, sometimes overlapped ATC communications 
or crew checklist callouts. Crew members handled these situa-
tions by sharing the workload, i.e. the Flight Engineer would 
respond to SELCALL or CABIN CALL while the pilot-not-flying would 
respond to the ATC transmission. There were instances when the 
pilot-not-flying requested a repetion of the message from the 
controller. There were also instances when the Flight Engineer 
delayed his response to the CABIN CALL until after completing his 
other verbal transaction, say reporting observed winds aloft to 
the company. 
There were 
louts omitted 
occasional instances of individual approach cal-
when they would have overlapped with other voice 
communications. On one flight, for example, the controller ad-
vised the crew of men and equipment beside the runway when the 
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aircraft was at 300 feet AFL. The 300-foot callout was not made 
in this instance although other hundred foot-foot callouts were 
made. 
Occasionally certain ten-foot callouts were systematically 
omitted by the PNF when the sink rate during flare was relatively 
higher. The PNF was observed to call "50, 30, 10". This seemed 
to convey the added information about the higher than average 
sink rate to the pilot-flying. 
There were no approaches observed for which no callouts were 
made. Rather, individual callouts were systematically omitted 
according to specific circumstances of the approach. But in 
these cases, prior and succeeding callouts were made. 
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SYNTHESIZER CALLOUT SYSTEM (SYNCALL) 
Figure 2 shows the experimental SYNCALL system designed to 
test the concept of automatic approach callouts. This system was 
designed to include all of the types of automatic approach cal-
louts that might be useful. As such it was an experimental tool 
rather than a prototype system. 
System Design 
The synthesizer was programmed to make both normal and devia-
tion callouts. The normal callouts were the standard callouts 
then required for all approaches by the participating airline. 
Table 4 lists the normal callouts made by the SYNCALL system with 
the flight condition that triggered each callout listed in the 
left column and the wording of each corresponding callout in the 
right column. A given normal callout was spoken by SYNCALL only 
once for a given approach. Also, if SYNCALL detected that it 
would deliver a normal callout within +1-50 feet of the altitude 
at which a Decision Height callout, a 100 feet above MDA callout, 
or an MDA callout was to be made or had been made, it supressed 
that normal callout. 
The SYNCALL system was programmed to make deviation callouts 
only if glideslope deviation, localizer deviation, airspeed, or 
sink rate deviated beyond the tolerances that the Pilot-not-
Flying is required to use for PNF deviation callouts. For exam-
ple, the Pilot-not-Flying and the FIE were required to call devi-
ations of +1-5 KTS or more deviation from the selected approach 
airspeed. The SYNC ALL system was programmed to make an airspeed 
deviation callout if the deviation reached +1-7 KTS. The SYNCALL 
system was designed with larger tolerances so that it would serve 
as a back-up on deviation callouts for both the PNF and the FIE 
rather than functionally replacing these two crew members for the 
deviation monitoring and callout task. This was done because it 
was feared that the PNF and FiE might not monitor the flight in-
struments often enough or be left out of the information loop if 
the SYNCALL deviation callouts were not designed to give them 
first chance to detect any deviations. Table 5 lists the devia-
tion callouts with the flight conditions that triggered them on 
the right and the callout wordings on the left. 
It will be noted that some of the modes for the Ground Prox-
imity Warning System (GPWS) coincide with conditions that would 
normally trigger deviation callouts by the SYNCALL system, cf. 
"Glideslope" for 1.3 dots or more below the glideslope. In order 
to avoid the aural confusion of concurrent voice messages from 
different sources but stating the same message, the aural warning 
of the GPWS was disabled when the SYNCALL system was in use. The 
SYNCALL system was programmed to perform all of the relevant GPWS 
callouts in addition to the deviation callouts that are not made 
by the GPWS system. In the case of simultaneously occurring 
demands for two or more deviation callouts, the callouts were 
made in sequence. The priority assignment from highest to lowest 
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SYNCALL APPROACH CALLOUTS 
/wI.-:=- TRANSITION LEVEL * 
\~-11'000' MSL (FL 110 IF TRANSITION LEVEL IS AT OR BELOW) ~_ F~r 1,000' AFL 
/ 
i1"'-. / 500' AFL, AIRSPEED ± APPROACH 
G/S :: '" SPEED AND DESCENT RATE 
INTERCEPTION:; "'''- 400' AFL 
(IF MAKING :. 100' 'J 300' AFL 
I LS APPROACH) ABOVE ~ ~~ 200' AFL 
MDA /~.....-DH 
MDA~ 
OUTER MARKER AND 
AFL CROSSING ALTITUDE 
50' RADIO ALTIMETER 
TO TOUCHDOWN AT 
10' INCREMENTS 
DEVIATION CALLOUTS 
AIRSPEED - BELOW 600 AFL, APPROACH SPEED ±7 kt 
RATE OF DESCENT - BELOW 600 AFL 1200 fpm 
BELOW 300 AFL 1000 fpm 
LOCALIZER - ± 1/2 DOT 
GLiDESLOPE - ± 1-1/3 DOT 
Fi3ura 2. - Experimental SYNCALL (3ynthcsizad Approach Callout) 
System. 
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TABLE 4. SYNCALL CALLOUT TRIGGERING CONDITIONS AND 
CORRESPONDING CALLOUT WORDINGS FOR NORMAL CALLOUTS 
TRIGGERING CONDITION 
Glideslope Interception 
Localizer Interception 
5 s after Outer Marker 
Triggering 
Descending Through 1000 ft AFL 
Descending Through 500 ft AFL 
Descending Through 400 ft AFL 
Descending Through 300 ft AFL • 
Descending Through 200 ft AFL 
Descending Through 100 ft AFL 
Descending Through DH Setting 
on Radio Altimeter and 
Setting < or = 250 ft 
Descending Through 100 feet 
Above Radio Altimeter DH 
Setting & Setting > 250 ft 
Descending Through DH Setting 
on Radio Altimeter and 
Setting > 250 ft 
Descending Through 50 ft Radio 
Altimeter 
" 
40 ft Radio Alt. 
" 
30 ft " 
" 20 ft " 
" 
10 ft 
" 
CALLOUT WORDING 
GLIDESLOPE INTERCEPT 
LOCALIZER INTERCEPT 
OUTER MARKER (----) ABOVE FIELD 
ONE THOUSAND FEET ABOVE FIELD 
FIVE HUNDRED FEET. AIRSPEED 
(+1- ----), SINK IS (----) 
FOUR HUNDRED 
THREE HUNDRED 
TWO HUNDRED 
ONE HUNDRED 
DECISION HEIGHT 
ONE HUNDRED FEET ABOVE MDA 
MDA 
FIFTY 
FORTY 
THIRTY 
TWENTY 
TEN 
KEY! (----) refers to a specific value spoken by SYNCALL 
e.g. "Five Hundred Feet, Airspeed + 10, Sink is 800." 
DH Decision Height 
MDA Minimum Descent Altitude 
• Note: Theoretically, when the Autoland Mode of the autopilot 
was engaged, indicating a Category II Approach, SYNCALL moni-
tored the Radio Altimeter for altitude information from 300 
feet to touchdown. Otherwise SYNC ALL monitored Barometric 
Altitude from the Captain's Altimeter, which was set to 
Altitude Above Field Level (AFL) until 100 feet. This was in 
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accordance with airline procedure to eliminate erroneous AFL 
altitude readouts due to uneven terrain on final approach. 
was GPWS mode 2a or 2b (Excessive Terrain Closure), glideslope, 
indicated airspeed, sink rate, and localizer. A given deviation 
callout was spoken only once. If, however, the out-of-tolerance 
condition had not been corrected after a specific time lag, the 
deviation callout was repeated. This time lag was 5 s for the 
glideslope, airspeed, and sink rate deviation callouts and 10 s 
for the localizer deviation callouts. For airspeed and sink rate 
deviation callouts, a repetition was triggered after the time lag 
if the deviation was still out of tolerance. For localizer and 
glideslope deviation callouts, a repetition was triggered only if 
after the lag the aircraft was not closing on the desired in-
tolerance window, i.e. only if the deviation was of the same mag-
nitude or greater than it had been when the previous deviation 
callout was triggered. This type of repetition logic was 
designed because it takes time for the aircraft to respond to the 
pilot's control input to correct flight path deviations in 
glideslope and localizer. As long as the flightpath was in the 
process of being corrected, the SYNC ALL system made no repeti-
tions of the deviation callout, so as to reduce nuisance cal-
louts. 
Voice Message Design 
The wording of the voice messages was selected so as to 
adhere as much as possible to the phraseology used by the crew 
for the approach call outs while applying previous research on 
voice warning message wording (2) to ensure high intelligibility 
even with competing human speech messages. Table 6 lists the 
wordings for each type of SYNCALL approach callout. These word-
ings were then tested for intelligibility under conditions that 
were more difficult than any expected to occur in a real cockpit. 
(See Appendix A) 
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TABLE 5. SYNCALL CALLOUT TRIGGERINGS AND CORRESPONDING 
CALLOUT WORDINGS FOR DEVIATION CALLOUTS 
TRIGGERING CONDITION 
After GIS Capture, if 
AIC >1= 1 1/3 dots 
above Glideslope 
Same as Above, except 
AIC same amount below 
Glideslope (=GPWS Mode 5) 
After Localizer Capture, 
if AIC >1= 1/2 dot right 
of Localizer 
Same as Above, except 
AIC same amount left 
of Localizer 
AIC Below 600 ft AFL 
and Indicated Airspeed 
> or = 7 kts above 
Approach Speed Setting 
of Autothrottle System 
Same as Above, except 
Indicated Airspeed is 
> or = 7 kts below 
Approach Speed Setting 
If 600-300 AFL & 
Sink> 1200 fpm or 
If < 300 AFL & 
Sink> 1000 fpm 
GPWS Mode 2a or 2b 
Triggered 
CALLOUT WORDING 
YOU'RE ABOVE THE GLIDESLOPE 
YOU'RE BELOW THE GLIDESLOPE 
YOU ARE RIGHT OF THE LOCALIZER 
YOU ARE LEFT OF THE LOCALIZER 
AIRSPEED PLUS (----) 
AIRSPEED MINUS (----) 
SINK IS (----) 
WHOOP WHOOP PULL UP 
KEY: (----) refers to a value spoken by SYNCALL 
e.g. "Sink is 1300." 
Notes: Deviation Callout repetition rate if condition not 
corrected = 5 s for Glideslope, Airspeed, and Sink Rate 
and 10 s for Localizer. Callout Priority from highest to 
lowest was GPWS Mode 2a or 2b (Terrain Closure), Glideslope, 
Airspeed, Sink Rate, Localizer. 
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TABLE 6. EXAMPLES OF SYNCALL CALLOUTS 
LOCALIZER INTERCEPT 
GLIDESLOPE INTERCEPT 
OUTER MARKER 1460 ABOVE FIELD 
1000 FEET ABOVE FIELD 
500 FEET, AIRSPEED +4, SINK IS 1300 
500 FEET, ON SPEED, SINK IS 1200 
400 
300 
200 
100 
100 FEET ABOVE MDA 
MDA 
DECISION HEIGHT 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
YOU'RE ABOVE THE GLIDESLOPE 
YOU'RE BELOW THE GLIDESLOPE 
YOU ARE LEFT OF THE LOCALIZER 
YOU ARE RIGHT OF THE LOCALIZER 
AIRSPEED MINUS SEVEN 
AIRSPEED PLUS NINER 
SINK IS FIFTEEN HUNDRED 
WHOOP WHOOP PULL UP 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
In order to study and evaluate the concept of an automatic 
approach callout system using synthesized speech, the experimen-
tal SYNCALL system was compared to a current airline system of 
approach callouts by the crew - referred to here as PNF callouts. 
For the data to be representative of the range of approach condi-
tions encountered in the operational enVironment, several types 
of approaches, varying in crew workload and amount of manual 
flight control, were flown both by captains and first officers. 
For each type of approach, data was collected for each crew for 
both the SYNCALL and PNF approach callouts for both captains and 
first officers as the pilot flying. 
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So as to obtain representative user-pilot performance and 
judg~ent data, current line pilots, i.e. regular airline pilots 
who routinely fly the aircraft, served as partiCipating pilot-
subjects. The experimental sessions were incorporated into the 
airline's normal recurrent training that is required periodically 
for air transport pilots. The crew members involved in the study 
and the Federal Aviation Administration were given a guarantee 
that participation in this experimental study would in no way be 
allowed to jeopardize a crew member's training in required 
maneuvers. In all cases, participation in the study was volun-
tary, and refusal to participate in no way affected a pilot's 
rating or flight status. In fact, the pilots typically expressed 
interest in the study and pleasure at being asked to participate. 
None refused to partiCipate. 
A major advantage of incorporating the experiment into on-
going recurrent training in an airline simulator was the added 
realism that could be attained fro~ the presence of completely 
operational aircraft systems at all crew member stations and from 
the use of flight procedures flown by pilots who were familiar 
with them and with the aircraft being simulated. It would have 
been difficult to obtain the same degree of realism in a flight 
research simulator since such simulators lack all but the most 
basic flight syste~s. The major disadvantage of conducting the 
study in the context of airline recurrent training was the set of 
restrictions imposed by the particular types of maneuvers that 
were part of the training syllabus. Since many of these 
~aneuvers were different types of approaches, they lent them-
selves well to the purpose of the study. 
Twenty crews composed of captain, first officer, and flight 
engineer 2 flew approaches of varying difficulty using PNF cal-
louts for half their approaches and SYNCALL callouts for the oth-
er half of their approaches. Table 7 lists the different ap-
proaches in the order that they were flown. Approaches 1, 2, and 
3 comprised "Set 1" and were always flown first. Approaches 4, 
5, and 5 comprised "Set 2" and were always flown last. For a 
given crew, Approach Set 1 was flown with one )f the callout sys-
te~s (SYNCALL or PH?) and Approach Set 2 was flown with the oppo-
site callout system. For Approach Set 1, both captains and first 
officers flew each of the three approaches (1, 2, and 3). For 
Approach Set 2, both captains and first officers flew the first 
two approaches (4 and 5), but only the captains flew the last ap-
proach (6), the single-engine approach and landing, in accordance 
with the airline procedures. Other than this discrepancy, the 
two approach sets were roughly balanced in that each began with a 
non-precision, manually flown approach. Next came an autopilot 
2. When scheduling did not permit the participation of a line 
flight engineer, a flight engineer instructor served as flight 
engineer to complete the three-man crew. 
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TABLE 7. APPROACHES FLO~N FOR SYNCALL EVALUATION 
PILOT FLYING APPROACH 
CAPTAIN 
LOCALIZER BACK COURSE 
SET 
2 DUAL LAND 
3 2-ENGIN~ ILS 
4 VOR RAW DATA 
SET 
5 SINGLE LAND 
2 
6 1-ENGINE LANDING 
FIRST OFFICER 
LOCALIZER BACK COURSE 
ILS APPROACH ONLY 
2-ENGINE ILS 
VOH RA~ DATA 
ILS APPROACH O~LY 
assisted, precision approach. Finally there was an approach with 
one or more engines out. A given approach as flown by a captain 
or a first officer was flown to similar but not identical 
mlnlmums due to the fact that captains are qualified to fly to 
lower minimums using more of the autopilot capability than are 
first officers. These small compromises in experimental design 
were deemed well worth the added realism that was gained by fol-
lowing airline procedures exactly. Table 3 shows the experimen-
tal design in block form. 
For half the crews, the captain flew Approach Set first, 
followed by the first officer flying Approach Set 1. Then the 
captain flew approaches 4 and 5 of Approach Set 2 followed by the 
first officer flying these two approaches. The last approach to 
be flown was always approach 6, by the captain. For the other 
half of the crews, the first officer flew first for each approach 
set followed by the captain. For half the crews assigned to each 
of these orders, the SYNCALL callouts were used for Approach Set 
1 and the PN? callouts for Approach Set 2. For the other half of 
the crews, the PH? callouts were used for Approach Set 1 and the 
SYNCALL callouts for Approach Set 2. Appendix B contains de-
tailed descriptions of the four resulting experimental orders for 
the approaches. 3 
3. Captain Walt Estridge and Instructor Pilot Colby Noyas were 
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TABLE 8. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
APPROACH SET 
ORDER SET 1 SET 2 
SYNC ALL PNF 
CAPT FlO CAPT FlO 
2 SYNCALL PNF 
FlO CAPT FlO CAPT 
3 PNF SYNC ALL 
CAPT FlO CAPT FlO 
4 PNF SYNCALL 
FlO CAPT FlO CAPT 
DEVELOPMENT OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
The man-vehicle system composed of three flight crew members 
interacting with one another and with the multiple systems of a 
modern jet transport aircraft is extremely complex; the task of 
measuring the effectiveness of different types of approach cal-
lout systems within that environment shares many of these com-
plexities. Thus measurements of system effectiveness must take 
these system co~plexities into account. The measurements must 
also have operational relevance. They must relate directly to 
airline operations in a way that allows the system users (pilots, 
airline management, manufacturers, government regulatory agen-
cies) to base decisions on system implementation directly on the 
data. Special flight performance measures were devised for this 
study. These measures were computed from the raw data on air-
craft altitude, airspeed, selected approach speed, localizer de-
viation in degrees, and glideslope deviation in degrees. This 
raw data was sampled by the simulation computer once every 0.2 s 
and recorded once every 0.8 s during the experimental runs. 
It was assumed that a pilot generally attempts to fly an air-
craft within certain tolerances or windows and"that as long as 
performance remains within the desired window, no correction will 
instrumental in evolving the formal experimental design into a 
workable flight training syllabus that conformed to the airline 
training requirements. 
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be deemed necessary by the pilot. This assumption is supported 
by the observation that both FAA and airline company regulations 
are written with allowable tolerances. Also, pilots if asked 
will say they fly to tolerances rather than try to keep a needle 
exactly centered or positioned. Indirect support is also sug-
gested by the need to incorporate an "indifference threshold" 
into control models of human operator performance in order to ob-
tain an acceptable fit between model-predicted performance and 
observed human operator performance (3). If this assumption is 
correct, measures of mean deviation from an ideal value for, say, 
airspeed would have little operational relevance to what a pilot 
judges to be good performance. For example, if the pilot at-
tempts to fly within +1-5 KTS of a selected approach speed, he 
will be satisfied if he remains within +1-2 KTS but will make a 
correction if airspeed deviates by +9 KTS from approach speed. 
It would seem more relevant to keep track of whether a pilot 
flies inside or outside the tolerance window for a given parame-
ter (airspeed, sink rate, localizer deviation, or glideslope de-
viation) and, when outside tolerance, to monitor the average and 
maximum deviations from the boundary of the tolerance window -
not from the ideal value. This reasoning led to the choice of 
four computed operationally relevant measures of flight perfor-
mance for the approach segment. 
Percent ~ ~ Qf Tolerance 
For each of the three approach segments (I, II, and III) the 
percentage of the total duration of the segment that 
outside the tolerance window for a given parameter was 
This was done by taking the number of 0.8-s samples for 
parameter was outside the tolerance window and dividing 
number of 0.8-s samples in the entire segment. 
Maximum Deviation 
was flown 
computed. 
which the 
by the 
The maximum deviation, the deviation with the largest abso-
lute value, and the direction of that deviation (positive, nega-
tive, right, left, etc.) for each of the four parameters for each 
of the three approach segments was recorded. This value was then 
corrected to reflect the deviation from the boundary of the 
tolerance window by subtracting the absolute value of the toler-
ance. 
~ Positive Deviation 
Since deviations both right and left of the localizer, above 
and below glideslope, and faster or slower than approach speed 
could occur, mean deviations from the tolerance window boundary 
were computed for each direction. Due to the arbitrary assign-
ment of signs (+ and -) to the direction of deviation by the 
simulation computer program, the term "positive" deviation is as-
sociated with real world directionality in an intuitively oppo-
site manner. So, the arbitrary meanings of "positive" and "nega-
tive" are given for each of the four parameters below: 
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Airspeed 
Sink Rate 
Loc. Dev. 
GIS Dev. 
-21-
"Positive" Deviation 
lAS greater than V(APPR) 
Sink Rate greater than 
tolerance 
Deviation left of course 
Deviation below GIS 
"Negative" Deviation 
lAS less than V(APPR) 
Not applicable 
Deviation right of course 
Deviation above GIS 
The mean positive deviation was computed by taking only those 
0.8-s samples for which the parameter in question was out of 
tolerance in the "positive" direction, summing these deviations, 
and dividing by the number of out-of-tolerance samples. Thus, 
using an operational tolerance window of +1-8 KTS for lAS; if 
measured lAS was 158 KTS and selected V(APPR) was 141 KTS, then 
deviation from the positive tolerance window boundary of 149 KTS 
(141+8) is +9 KTS. For lAS samples of 158, 156, 150, 148, 149, 
144, and 140 KTS, the mean positive deviation would be (9+7+1)/3· 
or +5.7 KTS. Expressed in terms of deviation from the selected 
approach speed, the mean positive deviation would be +13.7 KTS 
(5.7+8). 
~ Negative Devia~ 
Mean negative deviation from the tolerance window boundary 
for each flight parameter for each approach segment was computed 
for deviations in the "negative" direction as defined above. 
This was done in the same manner as the computation for "posi-
tive" deviations. However, this measure was not applicable for 
sink rate since there is no minimum acceptable sink rate for an 
approach. Thus the computed "negative" deviations for sink rate 
were disregarded. 
Flight Performance Parameters 
As stated above, four parameters were measured for deviation 
outside allowable tolerance windows: airspeed, sink rate, local-
izer displacement, and glideslope displacement. These were 
chosen since they are the parameters which the pilot-not-flying 
and the flight engineer are required to monitor during the ap-
proach; and a comparison of performance on these four parameters 
as a function of callout system would give a measure of compara-
tive effectiveness of the two callout systems in keeping the air-
craft within allowable tolerance windows. . 
In choosing the operational tolerance window for each parame-
ter, it was necessary to consider the discrepancies between the 
raw data in the Central Air Data Computer (CADC) (simulated by 
the simulation computer) and the visual indicators used by the 
pilots to determine current airspeed, sink rate, localizer devia-
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tion, and glideslope deviation. The pilots could not be expected 
to correct excessive airspeed as ~easured by the CADC, for exam-
ple, if their airspeed indicators showed them to be within toler-
ance. Thus an operational tolerance for each flight parameter 
was derived by adding its operating manual ("book") tolerance 
(cf. Figure 3) and its "indicator" tolerance. 
Operational Airspeed Tolerance 
The operating manual for this air carrier calls for lAS to be 
within +/-5 KTS of selected approach speed (V(APPR» once landing 
flaps have been extended. The permissible error between the di-
gital autothrottle command setting, which controls the position 
of the orange bug on the airspeed indicator, and the actual posi-
tion of the orange bug is +/-3 KTS. Thus the airspeed deviation 
as read by the pilot-not-flying and the flight engineer as they 
monitor airspeed from the airspeed indicator could appear as a 5 
KT deviation when in fact it was an g ~T deviation according to 
data in the CADC. Therefore, so as to count as out of tolerance 
only those airspeed deviations which appeared as deviations to 
the pilot-not-flying and the flight engineer, the book tolerance 
of 5 KTS and the indicator tolerance of 3 KTS were added together 
to produce an operational tolerance of +/-3 KTS. Figure 3 sho~s 
this pictorially. 
Operational Sink Rate Tolerance 
The book tolerance for sink rate varies with altitude above 
field (AFL). From 1000 feet AFL to 300 feet AFL, sink rate is 
not to exceed 1000 feet per minute (FPM). Below 300 feet AFL, it 
should not exceed 700 FP~. There is a considerable time lag, ap-
proximately 2 to 3 s, between instantaneous vertical speed and 
the indication of vertical speed shown on a vertical speed indi-
cator (VSI). 4 Thus the pilots visual indication of sink rate is 
2 to 3 s old. The recorded sink rate data was taken directly 
from the simulation computer and was thus a derived instantaneous 
vertical speed. So, an indicator tolerance was needed for this 
data that would compensate for the time lag. The computation of 
this tolerance involved the average standard deviation of a ran-
dom sample of 2.4 s intervals of sink rate. 
Sink rate was averaged over 40 sets of three consecutive 
4. Although Instantaneous Vertical Speed Indicators (IV3I's) 
are installed in the wide-body jet used in this study, a 2 to 3 s 
time lag is deSigned into the indicators to to smooth the data 
going to the Central Air Data Computers (CADC's), which in turn 
drive the vertical speed instruments and altimeters in the cock-
pit. This is done to prevent momentary "opposite direction" 
vertical speed and altitude indications which would otherwise oc-
cur following changes in aircraft pitch. Pitch changes produce a 
momentary change in local pressure distribution at the static 
ports which results in a driving pressure opposite to that needed 
to give a true indication of direction of vertical speed. 
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OPERATIONAL TOLERANCE: AIRSPEED 
-8 kt 
BOOK TOLERANCE ±5 kt 
+ INDICATOR TOLERANCE ±3 kt 
OPERATIONAL TOLERANCE ±8 kt 
Figure 3. - Jperutional Tolcranc2: Airspeed. 
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OPERATIONAL TOLERANCE: SINK RATE 
BELOW 300 AFL: 974 fpm 
1000 TO 300 AFL: 1174 fpm 
BOOK TOLERANCE 
+ INDICATOR TOLERANCE 
OPERATIONAL TOLERANCE 
1000 
TO 300 AFL 
1000 fpm 
174 fpm 
1174 fpm 
Figure 4. - Jparational Tolerance: Sin~ Rate. 
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BELOW 
300 AFL 
700 fpm 
174 fpm 
874 fpm 
0.8-s samples of sink rate, i.e. over 2.4-s intervals. The stan-
dard deviation for each of these sets of three samples was com-
puted. Then the mean and standard deviation of these 40 standard 
deviations was computed and these values added together. The 
original 40 sets of three 0.8-s samples of sink rate were taken 
from 10 of the 20 crews, randomly selected. For each of the ten 
crews selected, a 2.4-s interval of sink rate was taken for each 
of the four non-precision approaches (LOC BK CRS and VOR flown by 
Captain and by First Officer) flown by that crew. The altitude 
at which each 2.4 -s interval started was randomly chosen from 
the range 1 - 1000 feet AFL. 
The mean and standard deviation of the 40 resulting standard 
deviations were 51 feet and 111 feet respec~ively. Their sum of 
114 feet was used as the indicator tolerance for sink rate. Ad-
ding 114 feet to the book tolerances of 1000 FPM and 100 FPM 
resulted in operational tolerances of: 
1000 - 300 AFL 
BELOW 300 AFL 
1114 FPM 
814 FPM 
Figure 4 shows this pictorially. 
Operational Localizer Devia~ion Tolerance 
The book tolerance for localizer deviations is +1-1/3 dot on 
the indicator scale, which is equal to +1-0.42 deg displacement 
from the center of the localizer course. The allowable tolerance 
for the localizer indicator needle is expressed in terms of 
"needlewidths". The needle referred to is the indicator needle 
which is driven right or left of center depending on whether the 
aircraft is left or right of the localizer course (valid only for 
the "front course" direction) The tolerance is +1-1 needlewidth. 
To convert needlewidth to dots - the unit used by the pilots 
the needlewidth and the distance between center and full deflec-
tion to one side were measured on an actual Course Direction In-
dicator (CDI) which displays localizer and glideslope informa-
tion. Accordingly, 1 needlewidth measured 0.22 dots or 0.28 deg. 
This indicator tolerance was added to the book tolerance of 
+1-1/3 dot (:+1-0.42 deg) to give an operational tolerance of 
+1-0.56 dots (:+/-0.10 deg). In round numbers, this operational 
tolerance is just slightly greater than +1-1/2 dot. See Figure 
5 • 
Operational Tolerance for Glideslope Deviations 
The indicator tolerance for glideslope deviation was computed 
1n a manner analogous to that for localizer deviation. This 
resulted in the +1-1 needlewidth tolerance being equal to +1-0.18 
dots (:+/-0.01 deg). The book tolerance of +1-1 dot (:+1-0.25 
deg) plus the indicator tolerance gives an operational tolerance 
of +1-1.28 dots (:+1-0.32 deg), or approximately 1 1/4 dots. See 
Figure 6. 
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OPERATIONAL TOLERANCE: LOCALIZER 
LEFT 
0.70 
= 0.56 DOT 
BOOK TOLERANCE 
+ INDICATOR TOLERANCE 
OPERATIONAL TOLERANCE 
RIGHT 
0.70 
= 0.56 DOT 
1/3 DOT 
1 NEEDLEWIDTH 
1/2+ DOT 
Fi~ure J. - Jperationnl Tolerance: Localizer. 
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OPERATIONAL TOLERANCE: GLIDESLOPE 
~~o 
'/,;~ 
o '~o 
O~ 
lJE:lOII/t 0.3<, 0/i 
7'<8 DOrS 
BOOK TOLERANCE 
+ INDICATOR TOLERANCE 
OPERATIONAL TOLERANCE 
~ .~c9 
~b /'~ 
1 DOT 
1 NEEDLEWIDTH 
1% DOTS 
Figure 5. - Jperational Toleranc~: Glideslup~. 
MEASURES OF PILOT JUDGMENTS OF SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
The purpose of administering a formal post-experiment de-
briefing to the pilots was to obtain in a systematic and objec-
tive fashion the pilots' subjective responses to the two callout 
systems. It was expected that experienced line pilots would be 
able to answer questions about potential advantages and disadvan-
tages of the two systems that could not be otherwise measured by 
flight performance parameters. By presenting each pilot with an 
identical set of questions and by designing the questions so that 
possible answers were mutually exclusive and yet covered the en-
tire range of possible answers by the inclusion of an option for 
an "other" response, it was possible to collect data that could 
be submitted to non-parametric statistical tests for signifi-
cance. 
Design Qf Pilot ~-Briefing Materials 
A copy of the de-briefing form exactly as presented to the 
pilots is in Appendix C. Preference grids, a measure that had 
been successfully used with airline pilots in a study of line pi-
lot preferences for design of cockpit warning systems (4) were 
used to study the effects of type of approach conditions (Night 
VFR, Day VFR, IFR to Weather Minimums, or Abnormal/Emergency) on 
whether or not pilots would want a particular callout to be made 
by the Pilot-not-Flying and/or by SYNCALL. A 7-point scale from 
"unsafe" to "highly desirable" with "no preference" in the middle 
was used to compare the present PNF system, the SYNC ALL system as 
configured for the study, the PNF system as reconfigured accord-
ing to the pilot's own responses on the preference grid concern-
ing desirable callouts, and the SYNC ALL system as reconfigured 
according to the pilot's own preference grid responses. Pilots 
were asked to rate the intelligibility of four types of speech 
they had heard in the simulator on a scale of 0% to 100%. The 
four types of speech were 1)SYNCALL synthesized speech, 2) Ter-
minal Radar Control (TRACON) ATC human voice messages, 3) Tower 
ATC human voice messages, and 4) Pilot-not Flying human voice 
messages (callouts and other crew voice communications). The 
last item was a list of possible modifications to the SYNCALL 
system as configured for the study. Pilots were asked to rate 
each modification on a scale of 1) Highly Desirable, 2) Desir-
able, 3) No preference, 4) Undesirable, or 5) Unsafe. At the end 
of the list were blank lines with instructions to fill in addi-
tional modifications the pilots thought they would want. They 
were asked to rate their own suggested modifications using the 
sa~e 5-point scale. This concluded the main debriefing form. 
A second, optional form was used to obtain additional, more 
detailed information about the individual callouts from those pi-
lots who were interested enough and willing to spend additional 
time. This form consisted of a set of semantic differential 
scales (5) chosen for their relevance to cockpit flight informa-
tion systems. Several of these scales had been previously used 
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in the study on line pilot preferences for cockpit warning system 
design (4) with consistent results. Others were added specifi-
cally for this study. Table 9 lists the semantic differential 
scales and Table 10 lists the set of callouts by each system that 
were measured with these scales. For purposes of comparison, the 
current GPWS "Whoop, Whoop. Pull up!" and "Glideslope" voice mes-
sages were included in the set of callouts to be rated on each of 
the semantic differential scales. These items were included be-
cause they were then and still are the only examples of electron-
ically generated speech that have been experienced by all airline 
pilots. Both the de-briefing form and the optional semantic dif-
ferential form were designed to be self-administered. Finally, 
to preserve annonymity, no names or other personal information 
were requested on either form. 
TABLE 9. SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL SCALES 
GOOD •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• BAD 
WORTHLESS •••••••••••••••••••• VALUABLE 
LOUD ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• SOFT 
ACTIVE •••••••••••••••••••••••• PASS: TE 
NOISy ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• QUIET 
SAFE •••••••••••••••••••••••• DANGEROUS 
ALERTING •••••••••••••••• IMPERCEPTIBLE 
ANNOYING ••••••••••••••••••••• SOOTHING 
HELPFUL ••••••••••••••••••• DETRIMENTAL 
DEPENDABLE ••••••••••••••••• UNRELIABLE 
DISRUPTIVE ••••••••••••••• COORDINATING 
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TABLE 10. TYPES OF· CALLOUTS MEASURED WITH SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL 
AS SPOKEN BY PILOT-NOT-FLYING AND BY SYNCALL 
1000-FOOT CALLOUT 
TEN-FOOT CALLOUTS 
HUNDRED FOOT CALLOUTS 
GIS & LOCALIZER INTEaCEPT 
FINAL APPROACH FIX & CROSSING ALTITUDE 
AIRSPEED DEVIATIONS 
SINK RATE DEVIATIONS 
GIS & LOCALIZER DEVIATIONS 
DECISION HEIGHT, MDA, & 100 ABOVE MDA 
AS SPOKEN BY GPWS 
"WHOOP WHOOP PULL UP" 
"GLIDESLOPE" 
PROCEDURE 
Each crew received a taped briefing of approximately 
5-minutes len3th explaining the scope and purpose of the experi-
ment. If all crew members decided to participate, they were 
given a taped description of the SYNCALL system compared to the 
PNF system accompanied by diagrams on projected transparencies. 
General questions about systems operation were encouraged. Next, 
the pilots heard a taped introductory passage by the speech syn-
thesizer to famil-iarize them with the electronic voice quality 
and "accent" of the speech. This was followed by a recording of 
each type of approach callout in the SYNCALL system with each 
callout pronounced twice. To speed learning of the synthesizer 
accent, the printed text of the speech was displayed concurrent-
ly. Tables 11 (following) and 6 (in section on Voice Message 
Design) are a reproduction of the printed displays. 
After the 15-minute briefing, the instructor pilot conducted 
the normal pre-simulation briefing on the flight maneuvers to be 
practiced. This was followed by four hours of recurrent simula-
tor training in accordance with the appropriate set of experimen-
tal conditions for each crew. The first hour was spent on other 
maneuvers and served as a "warm-up" period before flying the ex-
perimental approaches. A break of 15 minutes was scheduled 
between Approach Set 1 and Approach Set 2 in accordance with the 
normal training breaks used. To simulate the potential mutual 
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TABLE 11. INTRODUCTORY PASSAGE BY SPEECH SYNTHESIZER PRESENTED 
TO PILOTS FOR FAMILARIZATION WITH SYNC ALL VOICE 
YOU ARE ABOUT TO HEAR THE SYNCALL SYSTEM SAY 
EACH OF THE APPROACH CALLOUTS SO YOU CAN GET 
FAMILIAR WITH THE SOUND OF THE VOICE AND WITH 
EACH OF THE CALLOUTS. THE CALLOUTS ARE LISTED 
IN ORDER ON THE SLIDE SO YOU CAN LOOK AT THEM 
AS YOU HEAR THEM. EACH ~ALLOUT WILL BE SAID TWO 
TIMES WITH A SLIGHT PAUSE BETWEEN REPETITIONS. 
masking of concurrent speech messages from Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) and the SYNCALL callouts, a pre-recorded set of Approach 
and Tower transmissions, addressed to other aircraft, were played 
over the cockpit headsets to the pilots. The pilot instructor 
issued clearances in ATC phraseology to the crew, and they read 
back their' clearances with the cockpit microphone as they would 
have done in the actual aircraft. The author controlled other 
aircraft ATC message presentation on different simulated ATC fre-
quencies to assure that the simulated ATC chatter was appropriate 
for the runway in use and the simulator's position in the air-
space. The ATC tapes were edited from actual ATC communications 
recorded at the airport that was simulated for the study. 
Flight performance data was collected for each approach by 
the simulation computer. Data collection began at 3000 feet AFL 
and continued until either the initiation of a go-around on a 
missed approach or the touchdown ona landing. The following 
flight parameters were sampled once every 0.8 s: 
1) Indicated Airspeed (lAS) 
2) Selected Approach Speed (from ATS command airspeed) 
3) Altitude Mean Sea Level (MSL) 
4) Glideslope deviation 
5) Localizer deviation 
6) Vertical Speed 
7) Elapsed Time 
The times of occurrence of each callout together with actual 
values that triggered any deviation callouts were also recorded. 
The cockpit audio including crew conversation, ATC, approach ca1-
louts, and cockpit noise was recorded on audio tape. 
After the simulator session, each pilot completed the de-
briefing form and discussed the experiment with the author. 
Those pilots who were interested also completed the optional se-
mantic differential form. Many took it with them and mailed the 
completed form back. Pilots were offered a copy of the final re-
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port, when published. 
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RESULTS 
The results will be presented in sectio~s according to the 
individual measures (flight performance, system reliability, sys-
tem interference with other systems) that were used to assess 
callout system effectiveness. Because of the large number of 
different measures used, there will be some discussion of each of 
the major types of results in the respective results sections. 
Then the results of the separate measures will be compared for 
consistency. Finally, a general discussion will treat the 
results from different measures as a whole. 
Flight Performance Results 
Analysis of Variance (AOV) was used to test for statistical-
ly significant effects of 1) type of callout system, 2) pilot 
flying, 3) order of pilot flying, and 4) type of approach. 
Analysis of variance was chosen as a means of testing the data to 
determine the probability that any observed differences in the 
data associated with each of the four effects above could be due 
to chance rather than be caused by those effects themselves. 
Airspeed, sink rate, localizer deviations, and glideslope devia-
tions were analyzed as appropriate to each approach type for each 
of the four measures: (1) percent time out of tolerance, (2) max-
imum deviation beyond tolerance, (3) maximum "positive" devia-
tion, and (4) maximum "negative" deviation. 
First, all five approaches (1-engine approach & landing not 
included here) were compared for the flight parameters they had 
in common, namely airspeed and sink rate, for each of the four 
measures listed above. The final approach was divided into four 
segments for analysis, with the assumption that these segments 
might be flown differently and that the operational tolerances 
for the different segments would be different. The four segments 
were: 
I: 
II: 
III: 
IV: 
Final Approach Fix (FAF) to 1000 AFL 
1000 AFL to 500 AFL 
500 AFL to DH or MDA (depending on 'type approach) 
DH or MDA to Landing or Go-around 
(depending on how approach was terminated) 
Due to large differences among the five types of approach in 
Segment I, the AOV's were performed only on the data for Segments 
II, III, and IV. While a few callouts were made by SYNCALL or 
the Pilot-not-Flying (PNF) during Segment I (outer marker with 
AFL crossing altitude, localizer deViations, and glideslope devi-
ations), most of the callouts occur from 1000 AFL on down. Thus 
any differences in performance due to the type of callout system 
would be expected to occur in segments II, III, and IV. 
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Figures 7 and 8 show the different 4-way AOV's that were per-
-formed. The comparison of all five approaches was done with a 
2x2x2x3 mixed design for approaches 1, 2i and 3 and with a 
2x2x2x2 mixed design for approaches 4 and 5. The reason for the 
division of the analysis into two parts: Approaches 1, 2, and 3 
versus Approaches 4 and 5 was that those pilots who flew one set 
of approaches with one callout system flew the other set of ap-
proaches with the other callout system. Analysis of all five ap-
proaches in a 2x2x2x5 mixed design would have resulted in an un-
balanced design. There were thus 24 four-way AOV's (3 segments x 
4 ~easures x 2 parameters) for approaches 1, 2, and 3 and another 
24 four-way AOV's for approaches 4 and 5. 
Analyses of All Approaches Overall 
Aoproach Segment ~: 1QQQ AEL ~ 5QQ AlL 
Between 1000 and 500 feet AFL the only factor with signifi-
cant effects on airspeed and sink rate performance was type of 
approach. Significant differences (p<O.001) were obtained for 
sink rate performance for both sets of approaches (1,2,3) and 
(4,5) for the following measures: 
Percent time out of tolerance 
(Operating tolerance = -1174 FPM) 
Maximum deviation beyond tolerance 
Mean "positive" deviation beyond operating tolerance 
Significant differences (p<0.001) were obtained for airspeed per-
formance only for the first set of approaches (1,2,3). The fol-
lowing measures resulted in significant differences: 
Percent time out of tolerance (Oper Tol = +1-8 KTS) 
Maximum deviation from Approach Speed 
Mean "positive" deviation from Approach Speed 
The term "mean negative deviation" as applied to the data for 
sink rate and airspeed deserves some comment. During approach 
and landing, only sink rates greater than tolerance are of con-
cern. "Negative deviation", i.e. rate of climb, has no upper 
limit and was therefore not analyzed. 
For airspeed, there were no instances for any of the 20 crews 
for either pilot for any of the approaches for which airspeed was 
below the minimum operating tolerance of -8 KTS. Since all data 
points were thus equal to 0, analysis of variance was neither ap-
propriate nor necessary. 
Since the results for mean "positive" deviation were analo-
gous to those for percent time out of tolerance and for maximum 
deviation, Table 12 presents means (N=40 pilots) just for percent 
time out of tolerance and means fOr maximum sink rate deviation 
and Table 13 presents similar data for airspeed for Segment II. 
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Figure 7. - \nalysis of Variance Jesi3n for Approach Sat I. 
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TABLE 12. SIN' RATE P~RFORMANCB FOR ALL APpaOACHES DUHING 
3SGMENT II: 1003 FT AFL TO 500 FT AFL 
N = 40 PILOTS 
MEAN PERCENT TIME ~EAN MAXIMUM 
TYPE APPHOACH our OF TOLERANCE DEVIATION 
LOCALIZER BACK COURSE 39 ~ 1483 FPl1 
2 DUAL LAND / ILS APPR ONLY 1 % 1 '3' FPH 
3 2-BNGINE ILS 1 .~ 1 1 '78 F Pl'1 
4 VOR HAW DATA 30 ~ 1405 F Pl'l 
5 SINGL LAND / ILS APPH ONLt % 1174 FPI1 
Note: Tne were no statistically significant differences due to 
Pilot Flying, Order, or Type of Callout System During Segment II 
TABLE 13. AIRSPEED PERFORMANCE FOR ALL APPHOACHES 
DUlUNG SEGMENT II:' 1000 ~T AFL TO 500 FT AFL 
N = 40 PILOTS 
MEAN PERCENT TIME MEAN MAXIMUM 
TtPE APPROACH our OF TOLERANCE DEVIATION 
LOCALIZER BACK COURSE 34 % + 8 KTS 
2 DUAL LAND / ILS APPR ONLY 44 % + a KTS 
3 2-ENGINE ILS 16 % + 5 KTS 
4 VOR RAW DATA 41 % + 10 KTS 
5 SINGL LAND / ILS APPR ONLY 39 ~ + 12 KTS 
Note: Tnere were no statistically significant differences for 
Pilot Flying, Order, or Type of Callout System during Segment II 
37 
It is not surprising that sink rate performance on 
autopilot-assisted ILS and Category II Autoland approaches was 
better than for the manually flown non-precisio~ approaches. It 
is however surprising to note that airspeed performance between 
1000 and 500 feet AFL was worse for the Autoland approaches than 
for the manually flown approaches. Possibly the pilot antici-
pates needs for slight adjustments in pitch and power as the 
landing flaps and gear extend and is in this way aole to track 
desired approach speed better than the autothrottle system which 
can only react after airspeed deviates from programmed toler-
ances. No factors other than type of approach were significant 
for Segment II. 
A P P rca c h Se gm e n t .Ill: ~ A..E1. 1..Q llii. .ru::. 1iILA 
Between 500 feet AFL and DH or MOA (depending on type of ap-
proach) there were significant effects for type of approach 
(p<0.OJ1), callout system (p<O.05), and pilot flying (p<O.OS). 
Table 14 (a-d) shows means (N=40 pilots) for the sink rate and 
airspeed data for Segment III. The only significant effect of 
callout system was for maximum sink rate deviation for approaches 
4 and S with SYNCALL approaches resulting in no instances of sink 
rate exceeding the maximum operating tolerance of -1114 fpm and 
the PNF callout system resulting in a mean maximum deviation of 
21 FPH beyond the operating tolerance of -1114 fpm. No signifi-
cant differences in sink rate due to callout system occurred for 
Approaches 1, 2, and 3. Pilot flying had a significant effect 
(p<O.OS) on percent time out of tolerance (+1-8 KTS) for airspeed 
for approaches 1, 2, and 3. Captains on the average were out of 
tolerance on airspeed 22% of the time while First Officers were 
out of tolerance only 10% of the time. As with data for the 
previous segment, the type of approach flown had a significant 
effect (p<O.O~) on both airspeed and sink rate. In this seg-
ment, between 500 AFL and DH or MOA, performance was better for 
the autopilot-assisted ILS approaches than for the manually flown 
non-precision approaches. 
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TABLE 14a. AIRSPEED PERFORMANCE FOR SET 1 APPROACHES DURING 
SEGMENT III: 500 FT AFL TO DH OR MDA 
N = 40 PILOTS 
FACTOR MEAN PERCENT TIME MEAN MAXIMUM 
OUT OF TOLERANCE DEVIATION 
CALLOUT SYNCALL 
SYSTEM PNF 
PILOT WHO CAPTAIN 
FLEW FIRST FIRST OFFICER 
PILOT CAPTAIN 
FLYING FIRST OFFICER 
APPROACH 1 LOCALIZER BACK COURSE 
TYPE 2 DUAL LAND/ILS APPR ONLY 
3 ·2-ENGINE ILS 
13 % 
20 % 
15 % 
18 1-
22 r. 
10 % 
34 % 
3 % 
13 % 
+ 3 KTS 
+ 4 KTS 
+ 3 KTS 
+ 4 KTS 
+ 4 KTS 
+ 3 KTS 
+ 6 KTS 
+ 1 KT 
+ 3 KTS 
----------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE 14b. AIRSPEED PERFORMANCE FOR SET 2 APPROACHES DURING 
SEGMENT III: 500 FEET AFL TO DH OR MDA 
N = 40 PILOTS FACTOR HEAN PERCENT TIME MEAN MAXIMUM 
OUT OF TOLERANCE DEVIATION 
CALLOUT SYNCALL 20 % + 3 KTS 
SYSTEM PNF 12 % + 3 KTS 
PILOT WHO CAPTAIN 19 % + 3 KTS 
FLEW FIRST FIRST OFFICER 14 J, + 3 KTS 
PILOT CAPTAIN 13 % + 2 KTS 
FLYING FIRST OFFICER 19 % + 5 KTS 
APPROACH 4 VOR RAW DATA 31 % + 5 KTS 
TYPE 5 SINGL LAND/ILS APPR ONLY 2 % + 2 KTS 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
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TABLE 14 c • SINK RATE PERFORMANCE FOR SET 1 APPROACHES DURING 
SEGMENT II I: 500 FEET AFL TO DH OR MDA 
N = 40 PILOTS 
FACTOR MEAN PERCENT TIME HEAN HAXIMUM 
OUT OF TOLERANCE DEVIATION 
CALLOUT SYNCALL 6 % 56 FPM 
SYSTE:M PNF 6 % 51 FPM 
PILOT WHO CAPTAIN 5 % 44 FPM 
FLEW FIRST FIRST OFFICER 7 % 53 FPM 
PILOT CAPTAIN 7 j, 70 FPM 
FLYING FIRST OFFICER 5 'f, 37 FPM 
APPROACH 1 LOCALIZER BACK COURSE 1 1 % 106 FPl'1 
TYPE 2 DUAL LAND/ILS APPR ONLY a J, a FPM 
3 2-ENGINE ILS 5 '/. 58 FPM 
TABLE 14d. SINK RATE PERFORMANCE FOR SET 2 APPROACHES DURING 
SEGMENT III: 500 FEET AFL TO DH OR MDA 
N = 40 PILOTS 
FACTOR MEAN PERCENT TIME MEAN MAXIMUM 
OUT OF TOLERANCE DE:VIATION 
CALLOUT SYNCALL a % a FPM 
SYSTEM PUF 6 % 27 FPM 
PILOT WHO CAPTAIN 6 % 14 FPM 
FLEW FIRST FIRST OFFICER 1 % 1 3 FPl'1 
PILOT CAPTAIN 3 % 16 FPl'1 
FLYING FIRST OFFICER 4 % 1 1 FPM 
APPROACH 4 VOR RAW DATA 6 % 23 FPM 
TYPE 5 SINGL LAND/ILS APPR ONLY 1 % 3 FPM 
----------------------------------------------------------------
Note: For sink rate, Maximum Deviation refers to the deviation 
BEYOND the operation tolerance of 1174 fpm. 
----------------------------------------------------------------
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Approach Segment~: QR ~ MQA ~ Landing ~ YQ-Around 
Between DH or MDA and Landing or Go-Around, there were also 
significant effects for type of approach (p(0.05) and callout 
system (p(0.05). Table 15 (a-d) shows the means (N=40 pilots) 
for the sink rate and airspeed performance data for Segment IV. 
In this segment, the only significant difference resulting from 
type of callout system was for percent time out of tolerance for 
airspeed, and the difference was in the opposite direction from 
that which was expected - performance was worse with SYNCALL (35% 
time out of tolerance) than with PNF callouts (21% time out of 
tolerance). This reversal occurred only for the second set of 
approaches (Numbers 4 and 5). One possible explanation is that 
the crews who were using PNF callouts for these approaches had 
already experienced SYNC ALL for the first set of approaches and 
may have experienced some learning transfer to fly tighter toler-
ances with SYNCALL which carried over into their performance 
without SYNC ALL in the second set of approaches. Further exami-
nation of the raw'data would be needed to determine whether such 
transfer effects may have actually occurred. It should be noted 
that airspeed performance was generally worse for the second set 
of approaches than for the first, possibly due to fatigue. All 
experimental runs were flown between 20:00 and 24:00 Central 
Time, causing the second set of approaches to be flown between 
22:30 and 24:00. 
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TABLE 15a. AIRSPEED PERFORMANCE FOR SET 1 APPROACHES DURING 
SEGMENT IV: DH OR MDA TO LANDING OR GO-AROUND 
N = 40 PILOTS 
FACTOR MEAN PERCENT TIME MEAN MAXIMU~ 
OUT OF TOLERANCE DEVIATION 
CALLOUT SYNCALL 
SYSTEt1 PNF 
PILOT WHO CAPTAIN 
FLEW FIRST FIRST OFFICER 
APPROACH 1 LOCALIZEWR BACK COURSE 
TYPE 2 DUAL LAND/ILS APPR ONLY 
3 2-ENGINE ILS 
13 
21 
16 
1 1 
23 
4 
25 
, 
+ 4 KTS 
% + 4 KTS 
% + 4 KTS 
% + 3 KTS 
% + 4 KTS 
% + 2 KTS 
% + 6 KTS 
TABLE 15b. AIRSPEED PERFORMANCE FOR SET 2 APPROACHES DURING 
SEGMENT IV: DH OR MDA TO LANDING OR GO-AROUND 
N = 40 PILOTS 
FACTOR MEAN PERCENT TIME MEAN MAXIMUM 
OUT OF TOLERANCE DEVIATION 
CALLOUT SYNCALL 35 % + 14 KTS 
SYSTEM PNF 21 % + 1 1 KTS 
PILOT WHO CAPTAIN 25 ." + 1 1 KTS 
FLEW FIRST FIRST OFFICER 25 % + 1 3 KTS 
APPROACH 4 VOR RAW DATA 23 % + 9 KTS 
TYPE 5 SINGL LANDIILS APPR ONLY 36 'i + 16 KTS ,. 
Summary of ~-~ AQY'~ 
While there were statistical IV significant differences for 
type of callout system, the absolute magnitude of the differences 
was generally small. This is especially true for the sink rate 
data. Also, the differences due to type of approach were of far 
greater magnitude than those due to either the type of callout 
system or the pilot flying. Order of pilot flying had no signi-
ficant effects on sink rate or airspeed performance. 
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TABLE 15c. SINK RATE PERFORMANCE FOR SET 1 APPROACHES DURING 
SEGMENT IV: DH OR MDA TO LANDING OR GO-AROUND 
N = 40 PILOTS 
FACTOR MEAN PERCENT TIME MEAN MAXIMUM 
OUT OF TOLERANCE DEVIATION 
CALLOUT SYNCALL 8 % 50 FPM 
SYSTEM PNF 3 % 59 FPH 
PILOT WHO CAPTAIN 8 % 55 FPM 
FLEW FIRST FIRST OFFICER 8 % 79 FP!1 
APPROACH 1 LOCALIZER BACK COURSE 13 % 1 18 F P:-i 
TYPE 2 DUAL LAND/ILS APPR ONLY 2 ~ 16 FPH 
3 2-ENGINE ILS 10 % 53 FPH 
TABLE 15d. SINK RATE PERFORMANCE FOfi SET 2 APPROACHES DURING 
SEGMENT IV: DH OR MDA TO LANDING OR GO-AROUND 
N = 40 PILOTS 
FACTOR MEAN PERCENT TIME MEAN MAXIMUM 
OUT OF TOLERANCE DEVIATION 
CALLOUT SYNCALL 5 % 
SYSTEM PNF 9 S 
PILOT WHO CAPTAIN 6 % 
FLEW FIRST FIRST OFFICER 9 % 
APPROACH 4 VOR RAW DATA 9 % 
TYPE 5 SINGL LAND/ILS APPR ONLY 2 % 
Analyses of Individual Approaches 
129 FPM 
65 FPM 
112 FPM 
117 FPI-i 
166 FPM 
2 FPM 
Because of the large differences in performance as a function 
of type of approach and because the major purpose of the study 
was to measure manual flight performance, fu~ther AOV's were per-
formed on individual approaches. The approaches chosen for this 
further analysis were the non-precision approaches, the 2-Engine 
ILS, and (for Captains only) the 1-Engine Landing. 
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Figure 9 shows the different AOV's that were performed on the in-
dividual approaches. The design for analysis of individual ap-
proaches was a 2x2x2 across subjects AOV. 
All together this resulted in 3 segments x 4 measures x 4 
parameters for each of the 3 precision approaches plus 3 segments 
x 4 measures x 3 parameters for the Localizer Back Course ap-
proach plus 3 segments x 4 measures x 2 parameters for the VOR 
approach for a total of 204 3-way AOV's. 
When individual approaches were analyzed, Type of Callout 
System (SYNCALL or PNF) was the only factor that had statistical-
ly significant effects on flight performance. Furthermore, sig-
nificant differences in flight performance resulted only for the 
non-precision approaches (Localizer Back Course and VOR) only in 
the lower altitude segments (III: 500 AFL to MDA; and IV: MDA to 
Landing/Go-Around) and only for airspeed and sink rate perfor-
mance - not course tracking performance (Localizer and Glideslope 
where applicable). In each case, flight performance was better 
with SYNC ALL than with PNF callouts. 
Airspeed Deviations During Localizer Back Course Approach 
Table 16 shows airspeed performance for Segment IV (MDA to 
Landing/Go-Around) for the Localizer Back Course Approach for 
each callout system. There were 19 such approaches flown by ei-
ther a Captain or a First Officer for which SYNC ALL was used and 
11 approaches for which PNF callouts were used. 5 Percent time 
out of tolerance for the SYNCALL approaches was 13% compared to 
34% time out of tolerance for the PNF approaches. This differ-
ence was significant (F=4.30, df=1,28, p<0.05) Similarly, fewer 
approaches were flown out of tolerance at all (5) with SYNCALL 
compared to PNF (12). 
To discover in more detail what was occurring with airspeed 
performance during these approaches, a tally was taken to obtain 
the number of approaches that were in tolerance and outside 
tolerance at an earlier pOint in the approach (500 feet) when the 
normal 500 foot callout with airspeed and sink rate is made and 
again at the beginning of the segment for which performance 
differences occurred (MDA). Tables 11 a and b show number of ap-
proaches in and out of tolerance for SYNC ALL and PNF callouts at 
50n AFL and the corresponding data taken at MDA. A Chi-Square 
analysis resulted in no significant correlation between callout 
system and airspeed performance at 500 AFL (X(2)=0.07, df=1, 
p)0.10). But the Cni-Square for the data at MOA was significant 
(X(2)=5.55, df=1, p<0.02). Thus, while there was no difference 
5. If the crew on a given approach initiated a go-around be-
fore reaching MOA (as sometimes happened) then there was no data 
collected for that approach for that crew. This is the reason 
for the unequal N number of approaches for the two callout sys-
tems. 
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DESIGN FOR ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR 
INDIVIDUAL APPROACHES 
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TABLE 16. AIRSPEED PERFORMANCE FOR LOCALIZER BACK COURSE 
APPROACH DURING SEGMENT IV: MDA TO LANDING/GO-AROUND 
CALLOUT SYSTEM 
SYNCALL 
(19 APPROACHES) 
PILOT-NOT-FLYING 
(17 APPROACHES) 
MEAN PERCENT TIME 
OUT OF TOLERANCE 
13 % 
34 % 
NUMBER OF APPROACHES 
OUT OF TOLERANCE 
5 
12 
in airspeed performance at 500 AFL that was associated with type 
of callout system, by the time MDA was reached, airspeed perfor-
mance with SYNCALL was better than with PNF callouts only. Fig-
ure 10 graphs the mean airspeed deviation from Selected Approach 
Speed at 500 AFL and at MDA for SYNCALL and PNF approaches. 
Average airspeed deviation for PNF approaches tends to increase 
slightly (+6.5 KTS +/-4.9 KTS at 500 AFL increasing to +7.9 KTS 
+/-4.3 KTS by MDA). In contrast, average airspeed deviation for 
SYNCALL approaches tends to decrease (+6.3 KTS +/-3.9 KTS at 500 
AFL decreasing to +4.6 KTS +/-3.2 KTS by MDA) Analysis of Vari-
ance yielded no significant effect on average airspeed deviation 
due to either altitude (500 vs MDA) or callout system (SYNCALL vs 
PNF), but the probability of an interaction between the two ap-
proached signiricance (Fmax =1.85, df=17, p(0.10) Tnis analysis 
taken together with the significant effect on airspeed perfor-
mance associated with type callout system in the lower segment 
from MDA to Landing or Go-Around suggests that airspeed perfor-
mance improved during the descent when SYNC ALL was in use but did 
not improve during the same part of the descent when only the PNF 
callouts were in use. 
link Rate Deviations Durin,g ..t.h.g, YQ.R Approach 
Table 18 shows the sink rate data for Segment III (500 AFL to 
MDA) for the VOR Raw Data Approach. Analysis of Variance for ef-
fects of callout system, pilot flying, and order of pilot flying 
on sink rate performance for this approach yielded a significant 
difference (F=5.01; df=1,31; p(0.05) due to callout system on the 
maximum deviation beyond operational tolerance. The effect of 
callout system on percent time out of tolerance approached signi-
ficance (F=4.06; df=1,31; p=O.053) When SYNCALL was in use, there 
were no instances for the 19 approaches flown with SYNC ALL of 
sink rate exceeding the operational tolerance of 1174 FPH. Of 
the 19 approaches flown with PNF callouts 4 had sink rate devia-
tions in excess of tolerance. The mean maximum deviation of 
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TABLE 17a. NUMBER OF APPROACHES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE TOLERANCE 
FOR AIRSPEED DURING LOCALIZER BACK COURSE APPROACH 
AT 500 FEET AFL 
SYNCALL PILOT-NOT-FLYING 
INSIDE TOLERANCE 12 10 
OUTSIDE TOLERANCE 7 7 
Note: Data were available for only 36 of the 40 approaches flown 
since 3 approaches terminated in a go-around before the aircraft 
reached MDA and since data were not available for a 4th approach. 
TABLE 17b. NUMBER OF APPROACHES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE TOLERANCE 
FOR AIRSPEED DURING LOCALIZER BACK COURSE APPROACH 
AT MDA (= 239 FEET AFL) 
SYNCALL PILOT-NOT-FLYING 
INSIDE TOLERANCE 16 8 
OUTSIDE TOLERANCE 3 9 
these four "out-of-tolerance" approaches was 1412 FPM +1-167 FPM 
or 238 FPM beyond the operating tolerance of 1174 FPM. Percent 
time out of tolerance for all approaches together including those 
that were always within tolerance was 0 J for SYNC ALL approaches 
compared to 9~ for PNF approaches. Finally, for those 4 PNF ap-
proaches that were out of tolerance the mean percent time out of 
tolerance was 37.3%. 
~-Engine Approach snQ Landing AirsDeed Performance 
As stated above, the 1-Engine Approach and Landing is flown 
by Captains only and thus had to be analyzed separately. It also 
differs from other types approaches in the procedures for 
airspeeds to be flown at various segments of the approach. The 
other approaches are flown fro~ 1000 feet to landing using Ap-
proach Speed, abbreviated V(APPR). 6 On aircraft equipped with 
5. The pilots compute this mentally by adding one half the 
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TABLE 18. SINK RATE PERFORMANCE FOR VOR RAW DATA APPROACH 
DURING SEGMENT III: 500 FEET AFL TO MDA (435 FEET) 
CALLOUT SYSTEM 
SYNCALL 
(19 APPROACHES) 
PILOT-NOT-FLYING 
('9 APPROACHES) 
NUMBER OF APPROACHES 
OUT OF TOLERANCE 
o 
4 
MEAN MAXIMUM 
DEVIATION 
1412 FPM +/- 167 
(FOR 4 APPROACHES) 
an Auto Throttle System (ATS), like the one simulated in this 
study, the pilots set an orange airspeed command bug on their 
airspeed indicators to their chosen V(APPR). Tney then use this 
bug to visually assist them if flying manually; also, the ATS, if 
engaged, will automatically maintain this commanded airspeed. A 
callout of airspeed referenced to Approach Speed is made at 500 
AFL as a cross check. For the 1-Engine Approach, Approach Speed 
is defined differently. It is the 0 deg flaps/slats extended 
minimum maneuvering speed for the landing gross weight of the 
aircraft, abbreviated V(O deg/EXT). This higher approach speed 
is maintained until a visual landing commit point of 700 feet AFL 
in case the crew should have to make a go-around and thus need 
the added speed for a climb-out with only one engine. If they 
decide a landing can be assured from 700 AFL then the Captain be-
gins to reduce airspeed so as to arrive at 100 AFL with a speed 
of V(Ref) plus the conventional wind additives of one half runway 
wind speed plus gust velocity. The orange command airspeed bug 
is left at the higher Approach Speed of V(O deg/EXT) for the 
duration of the approach. Thus, in contrast to other types of 
approaches, the pilot now attemps to fly an airspeed well below 
that indicated by the orange bug, 10 to 20 KTS in the aircraft 
simulated for this study. 
The pilot-not-flying in this instance knows that the captain 
will be reducing airspeed below the approach speed shown by the 
orange bug and makes allowance for this when calling out routine 
airspeed checks or when making an airspeed deviation callout. 
The SYNCALLsystem, on the other hand, obtains its Approach Speed 
setting from the orange ATC command bug setting. Thus, when the 
headwind plus the added speed factor of gusts to V reference with 
the restriction that Approach Speed will never be less than 
V(Ref) plus 5 KTS or greater than V(Ref) plus 20 KTS. 
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captain slows the aircraft to the slower approach speed, the SYN-
CALL system would be inappropriately triggered to make an 
airspeed deviation callout. 
In order to determine whether such inappropriate deviation 
callouts had an adverse effect on airspeed performance during the 
Single Engine Approach and Landing, airspeed was measured· refer-
enced to the desired approach speed of V(Ref) + wind when the 
aircraft was at 100 feet AFL, the point at which procedures call 
for the speed to be at this slower approach speed. Airspeed per-
formance would be adversely affected if, for the SYNCALL ap-
proaches, airspeed was excessively above V(Ref) + wind as com-
pared to the PNF approaches. Table 19 shows mean Indicated 
Airspeed (lAS) minus V(Ref) + wind additives at 100 AFL for the 
10 approaches with SYNCALL and the 9 approaches with PNF cal-
louts. While SYNCALL approaches averaged 9.4 KTS above the 
desired approach speed and PNF approaches averaged only 6.5 KTS 
above approach speed, this difference, when tested for statisti-
cal significance by T-Test was not significant (T=1.01, df=17, 
p>O.10). Also, the number of approaches that were flown outside 
tolerance were almost equal with SYNCALL and with PNF callouts: 4 
out of 10 approaches out of tolerance with SYNCALL compared to 5 
out of 9 approaches out of tolerance with PNF callouts. However, 
the standard deviation of the airspeed performance with PNF cal-
louts was only +/-3.6 KTS compared to +/-7.8 KTS for the airspeed 
performance with SYNCALL. This difference in variability of 
airspeed performance was significant by two-tailed test for 
differenoes between independent variances (F=4.69; df=9,8; 
p<O.05) Tnus the captains' airspeed at 100 feet during the 
Single-Engine Approach and Landing was more variable with SYNCALL 
than with PNF callouts. This is certainly an adverse effect on 
airspeed performance from an operational standpoint. 
----------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE 19. AIRSPEED PERFORMANCE FOR 1-ENGINE APPROACH 
AND LANDING - CAPTAIN ONLY 
AIRSPEED MEASURED AT 100 FEET AFL 
MEAN AIRSPEED STANDARD 
DEVIATION DEVIATION 
CALLOUT SYSTEM I 
SYNCALL + 9.4 KTS +/- 7.8 KTS 
(10 APPROACHES) 
PILOT-NOT-FLYING + 6.5 KTS +/- 3.6 KTS 
(9 APPROACHES) 
----------------------------------------------------------------
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Summary Qf Individual Approach Results 
In summary, there were specific instances of improved perfor-
mance on airpseed and sink rate when SYNCALL was in use for the 
non-precision approaches. However, when SYNCALL made inappropri-
ate airspeed deviation callouts for the 1-Engine Approach, 
airspeed performance became more variable and there was a trend 
for the pilot-flying to erroneously heed the inappropriate cal-
lout. 
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3YNCALL And Pilot-Not-Flyin~ Callout Perform3nca 
The COCkpit audio recordin~s for ten of the twenty crews were 
analyzed to obtain several types of d~ta. The ten crews were 
chosen such that half the crews had flown witn 3YN~ALL first ~nd 
tnerefore with Approach Set 1, and the other half had flown with 
SYNCALL last and therefore with Approacn Set 2. Each callout 
made either by the SYNCALL system or by a crew ~e~ber was tran-
scribed. Wnen both SYNCALL ~nj PNF callouts were made for a 
given item, the relative order of the two callouts was noted. 
For the approacnes flown using PN~ callouts, the audio of tne 
SYNCALL system had been turned off in tne COCkpit. However, t~e 
SYNCALL system continued to function, albeit Silently dS far as 
the cre~ was concerned. These callouts made by 3YNCALL were 
recorded on audio tape mixed with the on~oin3 cockpit audio for 
the PNF approaches. Thus it was possible to determine, for the 
PUP approaches, whether SYNCALL would nave made a given callout, 
had it been operational and to compare the reliability of 3YNCALL 
to PUF callouts in terms of 1) whether a given callout was made 
or not and 2) which system made the callout first: SYNCALL or 
PNF. 7 Finally, a tabulation was made of other concurrent audi~ 
events that occurred in the cockpit W~! I SYNCALL callouts would 
have been made for the approaches that used PNP callouts. 
Reliabi-LLU..Q...( C3.l1outs 
Table 2~ shows the reliability of ?NF and of SYNCALL for mak-
ing normal approach callouts in the simUlator. For the 53 ap-
proaches for which PUP callouts were used, a total of 746 cal-
louts were required. 507 of these or 72~ were roa1e by the 
Pilot-not-Flying. For the 53 approaches witn SYNCALL, ~ total of 
535 normal callouts were required. 8 6J9 of these or 371 were 
made by SYNCALL. It should be noted that there were no ap-
proaChes for which no callouts at all were made, fo~ either sys-
tem. Rather, for some approaches not all the callouts were ~ade, 
and this was true for both systems. The difference in number of 
callouts made by SYHCALL and by PNF was significant (X(2)=91.24, 
df=1, p<O.OJ2). 
Since any conclusions regardin~ tne relative reliability of a 
7. This ingenious idea was the suggestion of G2ne Tomlinson, 
simulation computer programmer for the project. 
8. Tne difference of 745 required callouts the 53 PNF ap-
proaches compared to the 535 required callouts for the 53 SYNC ALL 
approaches resulted from the differences in go-around altitudes 
used by different pilots for those approaches that were terminat-
ed in go-arounds. For eXample, a go-around at 450 feet would re-
quire altitude callouts only to 500 feet while a go-around at '50 
feet would require altitude callouts all the way down to 200 
feet. 
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----~------------------------------------------------- ----------
TABL~ 20. R~LIABILITY 0F SYNCALL AND OF PILOT-tIOT-FLYING ?OR 
~AKING NORMAL APPRJACH CALL0UTS Iii TH~ SIMULATOR 
CALLOUT 3YST~M 
3YNCALL 
(53 APPR0ACn£3) 
PILOT-NOT-FLYING 
(53 APPRDACHES) 
dAS CALL8UT ~AD~ ? 
YES ~O 
6J9 76 
239 
rOTAL P~RC~NT 
535 37 i 
746 72 , 
system like SYNGALL compared to Pilot-not-Flying callouts were to 
be made on the basis of data collected in a simulatio~ of actual 
flight, the reliability of ?NF callouts in the si~ulator was com-
pared to the reliability of PNF callouts in tne actual aircraft 
on the. line. This comparison could only be performed for normal 
callouts and could not be done for ~atchad sets of approaches 
since most approaches flown on the line are flown in visual 
weatner conditions even if oy instrument procedures. By con-
trast, all but the single-engine approach in the simulator are 
flown with simulated instrument weather conditions down to 1eci-
sio~ height or MD~. If any thin;, however, tnis snould tend to 
mnke PN~ callout reliability on the line lower than in the simu-
lator, if low callout reliability is associated with better 
weather co~jitions on the approach. Table 21 shows the reliabil-
ity of normal PNF callouts ~eing ~3de on the line and in the 
simulator with 73' of the nor~31 call0uts made on the line com-
pared to 72k of the nor~al callouts made in tne simulator. Tne 
difference in tne nu~oer of callouts made in each case was signi-
ficant (X(2}=9.91, df=', p<a.J02) with the normal callouts on the 
line actually oain; ~ore reliably made than the normal callouts 
made in the simulator durin~ the experim9nt. Thus, if anything, 
PNF normal callouts would De expected to be closer in reliability 
to SYNCALL normal callouts When made on the line durin~ actual 
flignt operations. 
In an attempt to maKe the line data and the simulator data 
more comparaole, the percenta~e of normal callouts made under the 
three conditions: 1} PNF on the line, 2} PNF in the simulator 
durin~ the experi~ent, and 3} SYUCALL in the simulator during the 
experi~ent were re-calculated, deleting from consider~tion all 
the MDA and DH callouts, since these were rarely required on the 
line due to tne ~ood weather (4 of the 64 line approaches were 
flown in weather close to the publisned minimums). Table 22 
shows the resulting percenta~es with the previo~s percentages 
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rABL~ 21. RELIABILITY OF PILOT-NOT-FLYING ON THE LINE AND IN 
TH~ SIMJLATOR FOR MAKING NORMAL APPROACH CALLOUT3 
FROM 10JO FEET AFL TO 10 FEET RADIO ALTIM~TER 
WAS CALLOUT :1ADE ? TOTAL PC:RCEIH 
YES NO 
ON TiE LINE 596 189 335 79 ~ 
(S4 APPiWACH~S) 
Iii THE SHIULATOR 432 172 604 72 ~ 
( 5 3 APPnJACHlS 
th3t did incluje MDA and DH callouts, for comparison. No sta-
tistical analysis of this three-way comparative data was per-
formed since the validity of such a comparison is doubtful. 
Rather, it is simply interesting to note that the 831 reliability 
of PNF normal callouts on the line would appear to be very close 
to the 85% reliability of SYNC ALL normal callouts in the simula-
tor. And this in turn brin~s into question the importance of the 
statistically significant difference between PNF and SYNC ALL nor-
mal callout reliability in the simulator. Tnis point will be 
discussed further in the Discussion section. 
TABLE 22. RELIABILITY OF NORMAL APPROACH CALLOUTS MADE BY 
PILOT-NOT-FLYING ON THE LIN~ AND IN THE SIMULATOR 
AND BY 3YNCALL IN THE SIMULATOR 
~DA & DH CALL OUTS EXCLUDING 
INCLUDED MDA & DH CALLOUTS 
ON TifE LINE 83 % 
PNF IN THE SIMULATOR 72 ~ 74 ~ 
SYNCALL IN THE SIMULATOR 37 % :3 5 :h 
----------------------------------------------------------------
The reliability of the deviation callouts made by SYNCALL and by 
PNF is shown in Table 23. While SYNCALL was designed to repeat a 
deviation callout if the problem was not corrected, for purposes 
of analYSis, such repetitions were scored as belon3in3 to the 
sa~e instan~e of a required callout. Tnus, if for a given devia-
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tion, the callout system made one or more callouts, that required 
callout was scored as havin~ been made once. It was noted that 
SYNCALL repeated deviation callouts for a given deviation far 
~ore frequently than did the PNF and this was the main reason for 
the chosen method of counting number of callouts made. 
---------------------------------~-------------------- ----------
TABLE 23. RELIABILITY OF DEVIATION CALLOUTS BY SYNCALL AND BY 
PILOT-NOT-FLYING IN THE SIMULATOR 
WAS CALLOUT HADE ? TOTAL PERCENT 
CALLOUT SYSTEM 
SYNCALL 
PILOT-NOT-FLYING 
(SYNCALL OFF) 
YES NO 
15 3 
39 49 % 
Data are totals from 53 approaches for each callout system. 
When PNF deviation callouts were used, 49% of the instances 
requiring deviation callouts had deviation callouts made by the 
pilot-not-flying. This is compared to 90' of the instances re-
quiring deviation callouts for which callouts were made by the 
SYNC ALL system when it was in use. Tne difference in numbers of 
callouts. made by the two systems was significant (X(2)=4 1 .63, 
df=1, p<O.002). 
Table 24 shows the number of deviation callouts made by the 
pilot-not-flying when SYNC ALL was not in use compared to the 
number of deviation callouts made by the pilot-not-flying when 
SYNCALL was operational. The PNF made only 24% of tne required 
deviation callouts when SYNCALL was also making deviation cal-
louts, compared to 49S of the required deviation callouts when he 
had sole responsibility for making these callouts. Tnis differ-
ence in numbers of callouts made in the two conditions was also 
significant (X(2)=1.41, df=1, p<O.01) ThUS, while SYNCALL was far 
more reliable than PNP for making deviation callouts, SYNCALL 
also seems to have decreased the reliability of the PNF callouts 
themselves even though the pilots were instructed to make devia-
tion callouts if required when SYNC ALL was in use and even though 
SYNC ALL was designed with larger tolerances than those used by 
the pilot-not-flying. 
Table 25 lists the individual normal callouts 
numbers of each that were or were not made by PNF in 
tor, by SYNCALL in the simulator, and for comparison, 
the line. The asterisks indicate those callouts for 
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the simula-
by PNF on 
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TABLE 24. RELIABILITY OF DEVIATION CALLOUTS BY PILOT-NOT-FLYING 
WITH SYNC ALL AND WITH NJ SYNCALL 
WAS CALLOUT MADE ? rOTAL PERCENT 
PILOT-NOT-FLYING 
WITH SYNC ALL 
PILOT-NOr-FLYING 
NO SYNCALL 
YES NO 
20 63 
39 50 
83 
Data are totals from 53 approaches for each condition. 
24 % 
49 % 
was a significant difference (p < 0.01) between the number of 
callouts made by SYNCALL and by PNF in the simulator. The cal-
louts for which SYNCALL was more reliable than PNF appear to fit 
into certain cate~ories: 
Critical Descent Altitudes 
Decision Height 
MDA 
100 above MDA 
Outer Marker crossing altitude 
Flight Path position 
Localizer Intercept 
Glideslope Intercept 
Routine read-out of performance values 
lAS at 5~O feet 
Sink Rate at sao feet 
Ten-foot altitude callouts 
50 
40 
30 
10 • T~e difference for the 20 foot callout 
could not be tested since two cells of 
the Chi-3quare had expected values less 
than 5. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that both in the simulator 
ani on the line, the PNF makes a 100 foot callout with fair reli-
aoility, 73% in the simulator and 38£ on the line compared to 77% 
by SYNCALL. This is particularly interestin~ since the flight 
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TABLE 25. RELIABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL NJRMAL APPRJACH GALLOUTS 
MAD~ BY SYNC ALL AND BY PILOf-NOT-FLYING l~ THe 
SIMULATOR AND ON fH~ LIN~ 
CALLour 
LOC INT 
GIS lNf 
a [1 
a (1 ALT 
1000 FEC::T 
500 FEc::r 
lAS f! sao 
SNK @ SOD 
4JO 
300 
2;)0 
100 
10Q+t1DA 
:1DA 
or 
DH 
50 
4::> 
30 
20 
10 
IN SHIULATOR 
PNF 
YES NO • /0 sig? 
14 
26 
23 
12 
50 
45 
27 
30 
30 
34 
34 
24 
15 
'0 
25 
24 
23 
25 
23 
29 
7 
10 
21 
2 
6 
20 
, 9 
22 
12 
13 
9 
7 
1 1 
14 
9 
9 
3 
5 
6 
33 
19 
70 
35 
96 
38 
57 
51 
58 
74 
72 
73 
63 
48 
74 
73 
74 
33 
79 
if 
It 
* 
f 
* ;r 
,. 
S'lNCALL 
Y E3 :~J 
39 
30 
32 
32 
51 
44 
44 
44 
32 
36 
23 
20 
21 
21 
25 
25 
25 
24 
21 
19 
1 
8 
:3 
8 
, 9 
17 
15 
5 
;) 
o 
'J 
o 
o 
o 
a 
o 
100 
9'7 
97 
9'7 
93 
35 
35 
8S 
63 
84 
59 
77 
100 
100 
100 
10,0 
100 
100 
10::> 
10D 
'ON fHE LINe: 
Pi'lf 
'lE3 NO ~ 
55 
57 
33 
27 
49 
55 
55 
56 
o 
o 
9 
, 
u 
26 
37 
1 4 
3 
9 
3 
86 
90 
59 
42 
78 
38 
35 
33 
o 
o 
3 60 5 
59 5 92 
55 3 88 
60 4 94 
52 2 97 
53 93 
manual for toe participating airline does not call for a '00 foot 
callout. None-the-less, the author in designing the SYNCALL sys-
tem and the line pilots both in the airplane and in the simulator 
appear to have 3enaralized tne concept of 100-foot callouts to 
include a callout at 100 feet. 
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Table 26 shows the relative timing of normal callouts made by 
PNF compared to those that would have been made by SYNCALL for 
the PNF callout approaches. Of all 746 callouts that were re-
qui~ed, 5~ werelwould not have been ~ade by S'lNCALL, compared to 
25% tnat were not made by PNF. 81 of the required callouts were 
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not made by either system. When both the PNf callout was made 
and tne SYNC ALL callout was/would have been made, a total of 62~ 
of the callouts, the distribution was closely oalanced between 
the PNF callout coming first (24%) and the SYNCALL callout coming 
first (29%) with a few instances of the two callouts being start-
ed simultaneously (9%). 
TABLE 26. RELATIVE: TIMING OF NORMAL APPROACH CALLOUTS MADE BY 
PILOT-NOT-FLYING COMAPARED TO 3AME CALLOUTS MADE BY 
SYNCALL FOR 53 APPROACHES. THS CREW DID NOT HEAR THE 
SYNCALL CALLOUTS. NORMAL CALLOUr PROCEDURES WERE USED 
NU:1BER P£RCE:NT 
i'1ISSING SYNCALL CALLOUT 41 5 ; 
PNF CALLOUT BEFORE SYNCALL 182 24 ;, 
PNF' CALLOUT 3Ar-1E T 1(12 AS SYNC ALL 55 9 % 
PNF CALLOUT AFTER SYNCALL 216 29 ." jo 
MISSING PNF CALLOUT 184 25 .; 
ND CALLOUT BY EITHER SYNCALL/PNF 57 3 " jO 
TOTAL NUi1BER 02 CALLOUTS 746 100 .. ' jO 
lllJ1:'..J:: 1llLd i 0 i n for ;113 t ion ..tjLU 0 vel" 1 a~ .;LULC_JtiJ... ~3. 11 QQ..t..§. 
Table 27 shows the percentages of SYNCALL callouts that oc-
curred at the same time as various other types of audio informa-
tion. Again, tne data was taken from the approaches for which 
PNF callouts were in use and SYNCALL callouts were recorded on 
the audio tape only, not heard in the cockpit. 50% of the SYN-
CALL callouts did occur/would have occurred at the sa~e time as 
some other audio information. Tne interference with ATC communi-
cations between the controller and the simulated flight was 
minimal (3% of the crew's transmissions to ATC and 3~ of ATC's 
transmissions to the crew. The overlap with other ATC chatter 
was higher (13%) but probably acceptable since pilots only occa-
sionally report learning useful information from listening to 
background ATC chatter (such as routing to expect and, occasion-
ally critical traffic information). However, 23~ of the callouts 
would nave occurred during crew checklists and other callouts. 
This relatively large percentage could ~ave masked eitner the 
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SYNCALL callout or the crew voice message, had it actually oc-
curred. 
In contrast, the Pilot-not-Flying when making Approach Cal-
louts was observed to sequence these with other crew checklist 
calls so as to minimize overlap. Like SYNCALL, however, the PNf 
callouts often overlapped with Other ATC. 
TABL~ 21. pg~GBNf OF SYNCALL CALLOUTS WHICH WERE OVERLAPPED 
WITH OTHeR, SIMULTANEOUS COMPETING AUDIO INFORMATION 
CREW TO ATC 3 ~ 
ATC TO CRC;W 3 ,<f /0 
OTHE~ ATC 18 % 
CREW CHECKLISTS/CALLS 23 ~ /IJ 
OTHER SOUNDS 3 " /IJ 
NO OVERLAP 50 J, 
Tit1LLIl&. Accuracy Q.[ ~-Foot Callouts .Q.y SYNCALL 
Figure '1 shows the minimum, average, and ~aximum errors in 
the timing of ten-foot callouts made by SYNCALL in terms of the 
difference between the called altitude and the ~ctual aircraft 
altitude when the callout started. The altitude errors are shown 
as a function of sink rate. ThUS, tha higher the rate of des-
cent, the less timely is the information given by a ten-foot cal-
lout. For example, with a sink rate of 200 FPM, the ten-foot 
callout for 30 feet would, on the average, start when the air-
craft had actually descended to 27.5 feet. For a sinK rate of 
1000 FPM, the same callout would start, on the average, when the 
aircraft had descended to 21.5 feet. Thus for high rates of des-
cent ten-foot callout altitude information by SYNCALL was not 
timely. Figures 12, 13, and 14 contain the actual data pOints 
from which the three curves were derived. Tne timliness of the 
corresponding PNF callouts can be inferred by examining the rela-
tive timing of each PNF ten-foot callout with that of the 
corresponding SYNCALL ten-foot callout and tabulating these rela-
tive time categories (Before, Same Time As, After) for different 
levels of sink rate. When this analysis was done, no systematic 
relationship was found, suggesting factors other than sink rate 
for the timeliness of PNF 10-foot callouts. 
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Ln_'ill..2.rooriate Cal..UL~ .Q:i SYNC ALL 
Certain callouts were made by the SYNC ALL system at inap-
propriate times or contained inappropriate information. Most of 
these were artifacts related to the instructional aspects of fly-
ing approaches in a flight simulator. For example, pilots heard 
an immediate "Localizer Intercept", each time the simulator posi-
tion was reset to a position on the localizer track. Another 
anomaly was the message "100 feet above MDA" if the instructor 
pilot used the altitude reset capability. These problems would 
not be expected in an actual aircraft. 
Otha: 3YNCALL callouts were made occasionally for situations 
which had been unintended in the design of the system. Unlike 
the inappropriate callouts listed above, these had some relevance 
to the current flight situation, and, in fact, some of the. pilots 
upon hearing them remarked that they gave useful information. 
SYNCALL called out the Outer Marker and crossing altitude any 
time the aircraft passed over the outer marker while being vec-
tored by ATC. "Localizer Intercept" was called out any time the 
aircraft was vectored through the localizer at an altitude less 
than 3000 AFL. Localizer deviation callouts were then made fol-
lowing such unintended localizer intercept callouts. Wnile the 
pilots found the unintended localizer intercept callouts useful, 
the ensuing deviation callouts were generally perceived as a nui-
sance. 
Finally, there was one instance of SYNCALL callouts that were 
not only inappropriate but which, while giving true information, 
presented this information in a way which implied exactly the op-
pOSite of the intended message to the crew. This was the case of 
airspeed deviation callouts which called airspeed as being exces-
sively slow when in fact the pilot-flying was purposely slowing 
the aircraft. for the single-engine approach, discussed above in 
the section on flight performance results. 
J&l...Lo u t s l.tl.<Lg, .Q:i P N F JiY.t Not ~Y ti CAL L 
During the experiment, it was observed that the Pilot-not-
Flying made other callouts appropriate and useful to the approach 
that the SYNCALL system had not been designed to m~ke. Some of 
these had been purposely omitted from SYNCALL system design to 
avoid nuisance callouts. One such was deviation callouts right 
or left of voa course. Tne simulator Course Deviation Indicator 
(CDI) did not distinguish Localizer and VOH signals; thus no 
difference in sensitivity for course deviation callouts could be 
programmed for VOH course deviations as compared to Localizer 
course deviations. The PNF did however, take this difference 
into account when ~aking deviation callouts during the VOH ap-
proach. SYNCALL was purposely designed to make airspeed and sink 
rate deviation callouts only between 500 and 100 feet AFL to 
avoid nuisance callouts. The PNF, however, occasionally judged 
it necessary to make such callouts above or below this altitude 
range. The result of the inappropriate negative airspeed devia-
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Callouts by SYNCALL. 
tion callouts during the single-engine approach was often posi-
tive airspeed deviation callouts by the PNF, reflecting the actu-
al situation if it appeared that the pilot-flying was erroneously 
heeding the SYNCALL messages and not slowing the aircraft. Fi-
nally, the PNF called out "Below MDA" or "Above MDA" if either 
occurred after reaching MDA but before the runway was in sight. 
Since SYNCALL had no information about visual acquisition of the 
runway, it would have been unable to make such callouts appropri-
ately. 
Summary of Callout Performance Data 
SYNCALL was more reliable than PNF for making deviation cal-
louts and also for making normal callouts. However, comparison 
with line data for normal callouts suggests that the PNF normal 
approach callouts on the line would be close in reliability to 
those made by SYNCALL. SYNCALL systematically missed certain 
callouts that were made by PNF, and neither system made all the 
callouts. Crew communications with ATC had minimal overlap with 
SYNCALL, however, a relatively large percentage of SYNCALL cal-
louts overlapped crew checklist and callout messages. 
Pilot Judgment Data 
Table 28 shows the percent of the 40 pilots who found each 
category of callout by SYNC ALL (normal and deviation) "useful and 
desirable" for each of the four types of approach conditions. 
Nearly all (85%) of the pilots who flew SYNCALL during this 
evaluation wanted the system to make normal altitude callouts 
during approaches when the weather was down to IFR minimums. 73% 
wanted SYNC ALL to make deviation callouts under these same condi-
tions. For the other conditions, the percent of pilots who want-
ed SYNCALL callouts of the two types ranged from 49% for devia-
tion callouts during Day VFR conditions to 78% for normal alti-
tude callouts during abnormal or emergency conditions. For N=40 
pilots, Chi-sqaure analysis with 1 degree of freedom yields 
p<O.Ol for any condition in which 71% or more pilots wanted SYN-
CALL. Thus the data support a strong pilot preference for SYN-
CALL during approaches with IFR weather, or with abnormal or em-
ergency conditions. For night VFR conditions, only normal alti-
tude callouts received this strong preference. There is no such 
preference for SYNCALL during day VFR operations. 
65 
TABLE 28. PERCENT OF PILOTS WHO FLEW SYNC ALL THAT WANTED IT TO 
MAKE NORMAL CALLOUTS AND OR DEVIATION CALLOUTS 
FOR FOUR TYPES OF APPROACH CONDITIONS. N = 40 PILOTS 
(20 CAPTAINS AND 20 FIRST OFFICERS) 
NORMAL 
ALTITUDE 
CALLOUTS 
(10 TYPES) 
DEVIATION 
CALLOUTS 
(4 TYPES) 
MEAN FOR ALL 
CALLOUTS 
APPROACH CONDITION 
NIGHT VFR ABNORMAL/ 
EMERGENCY 
71 % 78 % 
56 % 69 % 
67 % 75 % 
66 
DAY VFR 
57 % 
49 % 
55 % 
IFR TO MINIMUMS 
85 % 
73 % 
82 % 
TABLE 29. PERCENT OF PILOTS WHO FLEW SYNC ALL THAT WANTED THE 
PILOT-NOT-FLYING TO MAKE NORMAL CALLOUTS AND OR 
DEVIATION CALLOUTS FOR FOUR TYPES OF APPROACH 
CONDITIONS 
N = 40 PILOTS (20 CAPTAINS AND 20 FIRST OFFICERS 
APPROACH CONDITION 
NIGHT VFR ABNORMAL/ DAY VFR IFR TO MINIMUMS 
EMERGENCY 
NORMAL 
ALTITUDE 
CALLOUTS 57 % 68 % 51 % 68 % 
(10 TYPES) 
DEVIATION 
CALLOUTS 52 % 67 % 47 % 65 % 
(4 TYPES) 
MEAN FOR ALL 
CALLOUTS 54 % 68 % 50 % 67 % 
Table 29 shows the corresponding data for Pilot-not-Flying 
callouts. Using the Chi-Square probabilities from above, there 
were no conditions that reached the 0.01 level of significance. 
Thus, the pilots as a group were neither in favor of nor against 
pilot-not-flying callouts. 
Table 30 shows pilots' perceived intelligibility ratings for 
the synthesized voice compared to the human voice messages of the 
ATC -tapes and of the pilot-not-flying callouts. Interestingly, 
after this initial exposure, the intelligibility ratings for the 
synthesized voice were close to those for actual ATC communica-
tions. Many pilots noted independently that the electronic voice 
quality of the synthesizer made it very distinctive and left no 
doubt regarding the source of the voice. 
Figure 15 shows the mean ratings for all callouts on four of 
the semantic differential scales for each of the callout systems 
(SYNCALL and PNF). These data come from the 28 of the 40 pilots 
or 70% who volunteered to complete this optional form on their 
own time. Differences between ratings for SYNCALL and PNF cal-
louts were significant for all four scales (Informative-
Distracting t=-3.23, P<0.05; Helpful-Detrimental t=-5.12, 
p<0.002; Dependable-Unreliable t=7.98, P<0.002; Disruptive-
Coordinating t=-6.42, p<0.002; df=8 for each scale). 
67 
0) 
00 
SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL RATINGS OF 
CALLOUTS BY 14 CAPTAINS AND 14 
FIRST OFFICERS 
"'000 2-< 
INFORMATIVE ."T1 2. • • • • DISTRACTING 
--'--'--'--'--'--'--
HELPFUL • _. • . • • • DETRIMENTAL 
'--'--'-'-'--
COORDINATING • • • . • DISRUPTIVE 
-' '--'-'-'--
DEPENDABLE • 
_. : __ :_: __ I~NRELIABLE* 
SYN CALLOUTS MADE BY SYNCALL 
PNF 11111111 II II CALLOUTS MADE BY PILOT-NOT-FL YING 
*POLARITY OF THIS SCALE IS REVERSED FOR CLARITY OF 
PRESENTATION. SCALE POLARITY ON DEBRIEFING SHEETS 
WAS RANDOM. 
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TABLE 30. PERCEIVED INTELLIGIBILITY (PILOT JUDGMENTS) OF 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF SPEECH HEARD DURING SYNCALL STUDY 
SYNCALL (SYNTHESIZED VOICE) 75 % 
ATC COMMUNICATIONS (TAPED, LIVE) 76 % 
PILOT-NOT-FLYING CALLOUTS 88 % 
While both systems were judged as informative, helpful, 
dependable, and coordinating, callouts given by PNF were judged 
as more informative, more helpful, and more coordinating than the 
same callouts by SYNCALL. On the other hand, callouts by SYNCALL 
were judged as more dependable than the same callouts by PNF. 
For purposes of comparison to an existing system that pro-
duces voice messages on the approach to landing, the pilots rat-
ings of the GPWS "Whoop, Whoop! Pull Up!" and "Glideslope" mes-
sages are given in Figure 16. 
The next pilot judgment data was obtained from a follow-up 
debriefing form that was mailed to the 28 pilots who participated 
in the optional semantic differential form. Of these, 13 pilots, 
or 46%, responded in a period from 3 to 9 months after the exper-
iment. The follow-up debriefing form is reproduced in Appendix 
IV. 
Table 31 shows the modal responses for tolerance values for 
each of the deviation callouts. These pilots' recommendations 
for sink rate, localizer, and glideslope tolerances matched those 
of the SYNC ALL system as designed for the study. However, their 
recommendations for airspeed tolerances were different from the 
SYNCALL tolerance of +/- 7 KTS. They suggested +10 KTS and -5 
KTS. 
Table 32 shows these pilots' recommendations for active zones 
for SYNCALL deviation callouts. Their recommendations matched 
the original design of the SYNC ALL system. 
Finally, Table 33 shows these pilots' mean and median ratings 
of the recommended modifications suggested by one or more of the 
40 pilots who participated in the study. In the column on the 
far right is listed, for each recommendation the number of the 13 
pilots who judged that recommendation to be "essential in order 
for you to accept SYNCALL in your cockpit". 
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TABLE 31. LINE PILOT PREFERENCES FOR SYNCALL DEVIATION CALLOUT 
TOLERANCES. ALL DATA ARE MODES. 
AIRSPEED 
SINK RATE 
2000 TO 1000 AFL 
1000 TO 300 AFL 
BELOW 300 AFL 
LOCALIZER 
GLIDES LOPE 
RECOMMENDED TOLERANC~ 
V CAPPR) + 10 OR - 5 
2500 FPI1 
1200 FPM 
1000 FHP 
1/2 DOT 
1 1/3 DOTS 
Note: One captain suggested 1 1/2 dots for localizer back course 
and 2 dots for a VOR approach. Another captain suggested 2 dots 
glideslope to 500 feet AFL and then 1 dot when below 580 AFL. 
TABLE 32. LINe PILOT PREFERENCES FOR SYNCALL DEVIATION CALLOUT 
REPETITION RATES AND ACTIVE ZONES. ALL DATA ARE HODES 
REPETITION RATE ACTIVE ZONE 
AIRSPEED 5 SEC 600 TO 100 FEET AFL 
SINK RATE 5 SEC oQO TO 100 FEET AFL 
LOCALIZER 10 SEC LOC CAPTURE TO 
10';) FEET AFL 
GLIDESLOPC: 5 SEC GIS CAPTURE TO 
100 FE2:T AFL 
Note: Five pilots suggested an active zone for glideslope and 
localizer from approximately 1000 to 100 feet AFL. 
N = 13 pilots who responded to second debriefing by ~ail up to 
9 ~onths after having flown SYNCALL in the experiment. 
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TABLE 33. PILOT RATINGS OF THEIR O~N SUGGSST8D MODIFICATIONS 
TO SYN~ALL USING THE SCALE: 
UNSAF~ UNDESIRABLE NO PREFERENCE DESIRABLE HIGHLY 
OR CANtT DECIDE DESIRABLS 
5-------------4-------~-----3-------------2----------- __ 1 
SUGGSSTIO~S W~aE ~ADE BY ALL 4a PILOTS. RATINGS WBRE OBTAINED 
FROM '3 PILOTS WrlO RESPONDED TO SECOND DEBRIEFING BY MAIL UP TO 
9 MONTHS AFTER HAVING FLOW~ SYNCALL IN rHE ~XPERIMENT. 
SUGGESTION 
OBTAIN FAA & COMPANY AGREEMENT 
NOT TO USE COCKPIT VOICE RE-
CORDINGS OF SYNCALL FOR 
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS 
O}i IOF F SW ITCH 
ELIMINATE NUISANCE CALLOUTS 
PROVIDE TEST SWITCH 
MANUAL VOLUME CONTROL 
CALLOUT FOR "BELOW MOA" 
INCREASE TOLERANCE ON 
AIRSPEED DEVIATION CALLOUTS 
INHIBTT AIRSPEED AND SINK 
RATE DEVIATION CALLOUTS 
DUrlING ABNORMAL OR EMERGENCY 
APPROACHES 
MINIMIZE FREQUENCY OF 
t1~AN 
1.17 
, .23 
1.40 
1 .54 
1 .69 
2.03 
2.09 
DEVIATION CALLOUTS 2.15 
ELIMINATE GPWS AND REPLACE 
IT WITH SYNCALL 2.15 
REPEAT 10-FOOT CALLOUTS IF 
AIRCRAFT BALLOONS DURIN~ FLARE 2.15 
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SD HEDIAN 
0.58 
0.52 
0.70 
).66 
0.95 
1 • , 5 2 
1 .04 2 
1 .51 
0.80 2 
0.90 2 
0.90 2 
NU:1BER 
JUDG8D 
ESSENTIAL 
eN = 13) 
10 
10 
5 
6 
5 
3 
4 
4 
2 
3 
3 
WARN IF AIRSPEED IS 
BELOH ALPHA SPE:ED 2.17 1 • 1 1 2 
CLARIFY 3YNCALL AND PILOT-
N8T ["LYING RESPONSIBILITIES 2.23 1 .03 3 2 
CALL LaC CAPTURE AND THEi~ 
LOCALIZEH INTERCEPT 2.23 ·).33 2 
SHORTEN ME3SAGE ? ?-~.~? 0.75 2 2 
SPEED UP 3YNCALL SPEECH RATE 2.37 L ,.'3 2 4 
ADD OTH~R lVARNINGS, ~.G. ENGIN~ 
["IHE, LOSS Or' CABIN PRESSURE 2.45 1 .20 2 
AU r 0 [1 A TIC ALL Y CHANGE 3YNCALL 
PArlA!-IETi:':RS ACORDING TO 
TYPE Or APPROACH 2.45 , .05 2 2 
FOR :-JON-PRECISION APPROACHES 
HAKE SINK RATE DSVIATION 
CALLOUT3 HAVE TOP PRIORITY 2.46 1 .05 3 2 
;.1OHE ALERTING VOICE QuALITY 
FOR DEVIATIONS THAN FOR NJRMAL 
ALTITUDE CALLOUT S 2.52 0.87 '< 2 J 
INCHi::A3S TOLERANCE FOR 
GLIDE3LOPE DEVIATIONS 2.85 0.9J 3 2 
HAVE SYNC ALL SAY "CHECK FLAP3" 
AT 1000 FEET AFL 3.00 1 .0 J 3 
HAVE S'fNCALL READ OllT FLAPS 
SETTING AT 1000 FEi::T ~.FL 3.00 1 .29 2 
INCRiASE TOLERANC3 FOR 
LOCALIZER DEVIATIOlJS 3.03 'J. B 3 
ADD HL'13DIATt:: ASTIaN 
CfECKLIST IT Ef'1S 3.03 1 • 32 4 
HAVS 3YNCALL !'IAKi DEVIATION 
CALLOUTS ONLY 3.09 1 • 14 4 0 
HAVE 3YNCALL READ OUT 
FLIGHT GUIDANCE SYSTEl'1 t10DES 
AFTEtl LAND 110DE IS A Rt·ED 3. 15 0.99 3 
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D2:LAY CALLOUT U' CREil IS 
i'1AXING RADIO TRANSMISSION 
UNTIL T RAN 3:-1 IS S ION COHPLETED 3.23 1 .09 3 4 
INCREASE: VOLUME- 3.36 0.5::> 3 
HAVE SYN8ALL MAKE NOR!-1AL 
ALTITUDE CALLOUTS ONLY 3.46 0.97 4 
tilTH THE: 50-FOOT CALLOUT, 
CALL AIRSPt:ED A:W 3INK RATE 
AND ELHlIIIAT1!: 40,30,20,10-FOOr 
CALLour.s 3.54 1 .27 4 
Several of the pilots noted independently that the airspeed 
deviation callouts in particular were repeated too often and be-
fore they could slow the airspeed to within tolerance. They 
found this to be a nuisance and distraction. This judgment was 
supported in the rating data on the list of modifications that 
the pilots suggested for SYNC ALL on the de-briefing forms. Of 
the 31 suggested modifications, "Eliminate Nuisance Callouts" 
ranked 3rd with a~ean of 1.4 6n a scale of 1 to 5 for highly 
desirable to unsafe and had a ~edian res90ns~ of 1 (highly desir-
able). Tne suggestion "Minimize Frequency of Deviation Callouts" 
ranked 9th out of 31 with a mean of 2.'5 and a ~edian response of 
2 (desirable). It will be remembered that more pilots in select-
ing those callouts by SYNCALL that they though useful and desir-
able, ch~se normal callouts than did deviation callouts. Tne 
perceived nuisance of excessive repetition rates for deviation 
callouts could possibly explain the smaller percentage of pilots 
who wanted deviation callouts by SYNCALL compared to those who 
wanted normal callouts by SYNCALL. There was, inCidentally, no 
correlation between individual pilots' flight performance in each 
of the four parameters and the desirability of deviation callouts 
in each of the parameters. If anything, there was a trend for 
those pilots with greater percent time out of tolerance in a 
given p~rameter to be more likely to find deviation callouts for 
that parameter useful and desirable. The item "Increase Toler-
ance on Airspeed Deviation Callouts" ranked 7th with a mean of 
2.03 and a median response of 2 (desirible). Also, the airspeed 
tolerance was the only tolerance that the pilots who completed 
the follow-up debriefing form wanted chan3ed.- And the change 
they recommended was to increase the tolerance on the positive 
side frow +7 to +10 KTS while decreasing the tolerance on the 
negative side from -7 to -5 KTS. 
Summary ..Q..[ .e .. tl .. ~t Judgment Data 
Clearly the pilots who evaluated SYNC ALL generally found the 
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system desirable for some but not all types of approach condi-
tions. They seem to indicate that they would find it a useful 
aid but would not want to have to use it for every approach. An 
onloff switch was judged "highly desirable" and "es~ential" by 10 
of the 13 pilots who responded to the suggested modifications. 
It should be noted here that there were no differences between 
captains and first officers in the way they evaluated SYNCALL; 
nor did tha particular set of approaches the ~ilots flew with 
SYNCALL have any statistically significant effect on their 
evaluation of the system. This suggests that the pilot judgment 
data is reliable and that there is considerable agreement among 
pilots regardless of the position they fly or the specific condi-
tions of the approaches they flew using SYNCALL. 
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DISCUSSIO~ 
Im.2.!.ic~£.!2.~ ~ Improved F1i~ Performance 
The results of this study suggest that the concept of syn-
thesized voice approach callouts should be developed further. 
Flight performance with SY~CALL making the callouts was better 
during non-precision approaches than when only th~ current PNF 
call outs were used. The parameters of flight performance that 
were better when associated with SYNCALL were airspeed and sink 
rate. Airspeed (as an input to estimated ground speed) and sink 
rate constitute the raw data used by a pilot to fly a desired 
glide-path during a non-precision approach which, by definition, 
has no direct glide-path information displayed to the pilot. A 
non-precision approach is considered more difficult to fly just 
because of the lack of direct glide-path information as compared 
to the easier precision approach which provides glide-path infor-
mation displayeJ directly to the pilot. Thus the use of SYNCALL 
was associated with improved flight perfor~ance for 3 type of ap-
proach that is more difficult to fly. 
By comparison data for the precision approaches, showed no 
statistically significant differences in flight performance as a 
function of callout system. If SY~CALL were a benefit only for 
non-precision approaches, what might be the relative gain to air-
line operations as a whole by the implementation of a properly 
designed synthesized voice approach callout system? 
Non-precision approaches result in a large percentage of the 
air carrier approach and landing accidents and incidents, 53% ac-
cording to the ~rSB study (1). If a system which improves flight 
performance for this type of approach in particular made a suffi-
ciently large contribution to lowering the over-all approach and 
landing accident rate it might pay for its installation. Of 
course, one would have to consider other solutions as well, in-
cluding elimination of the non-precision approach from airline 
operations, different types of cockpit displays, and different 
types of flight information disptayed to the pilots. A compara-
tive cost anglysis of such alternatives is beyond the scope of 
this stu;!y. 
There is no single reasonable conclusion that can be reached 
from the experimental observation that SYNCALL was associated 
with better flight performance only for non-precision approaches 
approaches which demgnd high levels of attention by the PF and 
by the PNF who is monitorin3. It co~ld be that the higher atten-
tion workload that is usually but not exclusively associated with 
non-precision approaches is the underlying factor whose effect 
could be mitigated by SY~CALL. If this is correct, then SYNCALL 
would be expected to be helpful during any approach with high at-
tention workload. 
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Implications of Differential Callout Reliability 
The data on PNF and SYNCALL callout reliability suggest that 
the function of SYNCALL should be to alert the crew to deviations 
from desired flight parameters but not to make routine callouts. 
Altitude callout reliability by PNF was comparable to that of 
SYNCALL. Also 23% of the SYNCALL callouts overlapped crew check-
list callouts. . In contrast, the PNF minimized this overlap by 
sequencing altitude callouts between checklist callouts whenever 
possible. Thus one cannot attribute improved flight performance 
to any greater reliability of SYNCALL over PNF for routine alti-
tude callouts. And it is possible that SYNCALL altitude callouts 
actually interferred with pilots' comprehension of checklist cal-
louts. Pilots did, in fact, rate SYNCALL less "coordinating" 
than PNF. All this argues against automatic altitude callouts by 
SYNCALL. 
The case for deviation callouts by SYNCALL is very different. 
They were substantially more reliable when made by SYNCALL than 
by PNF. Also, because they occurred infrequently compared to al-
titude callouts, their interference with crew checklist callouts 
would be minimal and thus could be an acceptable price in in-
creased audio workload to pay to the benefit of timely and reli-
able alerts to flight performance deviations. 
Occasionally, however, an altitude callout can function as a 
warning of an unnoticed deviation. One can speculate that cer-
tain airline accidents might not have occurred, had automatic al-
titude deviation callouts been made (cf. 6 and 7). If a reliable 
algorithm to detect unnoticed altitude deviations during the ap-
proach could be developed, this could be a valuable component of 
a SYNCALL system. One algorithm for this is proposed for con-
sideration in the section entitled "Refinement of a synthesized 
voice approach callout system" • 
. Consistent with a SYNCALL system that calls out deviations 
only would be the incorporation of the Ground Proximity Warning 
System (GPWS) modes into SYNCALL. SYNCALL as tested included 
warnings for excessive sink rate and for deviation below the 
glideslope. The "excessive rate of closure with terrain" mode of 
the GPWS logically could be added to the set of conditions SYN-
CALL monitors and calls out. 
If this reasoning is correct, a SYNCALL system that automati-
cally called out deviations in airspeed, sink rate, glideslope, 
localizer, altitude, and terrain closure, only when deviations 
actually existed, could be a valuable addition to airline cockpit 
systems. 
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CONCLUSION 
The concept of an automatic approach callout system using 
synthesized speech definitely deserves further study. Improve-
ments in flight performance by airline pilots were obtained for 
approaches that have high manual and visual workload for the pi-
lots. By extrapolation, similar improvements might be obtained 
for any high workload approach. For the One-Engine Approach, for 
which SYNCALL made inappropriate deviation callouts, airspeed 
performance was worse with SYNCALL than with PNF. Reliability of 
normal altitude approach callouts was comparable for PNF on the 
line and in the simulator and for SYNCALL in the simulator. How-
ever, SYNCALL was more reliable than PNF for making deviation ap-
proach callouts in the simulator. pilots generally favored the 
concept of SYNC ALL and judged it more reliable than PNF callouts. 
They suggested modifications before it would be appropriate for 
operational use. It was concluded that SYNCALL improved flight 
performance for non-precision approaches, that a SYNCALL system 
should make deviation callouts only. For consistency, it is 
recommended that the modes of the Ground Proximity Warning System 
(GPWS) be incorporated into a SYNCALL system. The detrimental 
effects on performance associated with inappropriate deviation 
callouts led to the further conclusion that such callouts should 
be designed out of the system. Finally, in the section entitled 
"Refinement of a synthesized voice approach callout system", the 
results and conclusions of the experiment are used to develop 
suggestions for improvements to SYNC ALL before further testing. 
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REFINEMENT OF A SYNTHESIZED VOICE APPROACH CALLOUT SYSTEM 
Clearly the SYNCALL system as configured for this experiment 
is not appropriate for air transport use. This is evidenced by 
the fact that some of the data for some of the measures of system 
effectiveness found SYNC ALL to be no better than or, in some 
cases, not as good as PNF callouts. For example, SYNCALL was 
judged as more reliable than PNF callouts; but it was also judged 
less informative, less helpful, and less coordinating than PNF 
callouts. Tnese pilot rating scale data agreed with the callout 
system performance data on reliability of the callouts being 
made. And, the rating data on the scales informative/ distract-
ing, helpful/ detrimental, and coordinating/ disruptive were at 
least indirectly supported by the data on percent overlap of SYN-
CALL callouts with other voice communications in the cockpit. 
Finally, the long list of pilot recommended modifications and the 
"highly desirable" and "desirable" ratings they assigned to these 
modifications argue against implementation of the system exactly 
as configured for the experiment. 
Wnat, then, might an appropriate SYNCALL system be like? It 
is difficult to derive a coherent recommendation for system 
design froffi only one type of data. However, when the flight per-
formance data is considered together with the pilot rating data, 
the callout reliability data, and the percent overlap data, a 
consistent argument can be made in support of a general design 
for a synthesized voice callout system with certain variables 
still undefined or requiring experimental comparison among alter-
natives. Such a system, once configured, would then have to un-
dergo testing using a methodology similar to that used in this 
study. 
S YNC/i.k1. llS t em CompoJl..en Ul 
While SYNCALL was designed as a single experimental system so 
as to test several different types of synthesized approach cal-
louts, it was composed of differ~nt functional parts. These are 
listed below: 
1) normal altitude callouts e.g. 1000 AFL, 500, 400 ••• 
2) normal position callouts e.g. outer marker, G/S inter-
cept, 
3) deviation callouts e.g. airspeed +15, left of localizer, 
4) critical altitude callouts, e.g. decision height, MDA 
5) priority logic 
6) callout timing and repetition logic 
7) tolerance values 
The experimental design tested the entire SYNC ALL systeffi com-
pared to the entire PNF system of callouts. Thus no conclusions 
can be drawn from the results regarding the relative contribution 
of different functional components of each callout system to the 
observed flight performance, system performance, and pilot rating 
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differences. However, analysis of the data was done in ~ w~y 
that permits rational .l?-Q..eculatior), on the contribution of indivi-
du~l SYNGALL components to the observed differences. And the 
resulting speculations can oe used to derive further hypotheses 
for testing. 
When looking for the underlying reasons for the observed 
differences associated with the two systems, one naturally looks 
for diff~rences in performance between corresponding components 
of the two callout systems. Eacn of the seven system components 
listed above will be treated in turn. 
1) ~ql altitude callouts Both the PNF and SYNGALL made the 
altitude callouts reliably. Although reliability of PNF altitude 
callouts was slightly less (74%) than that of SYNC ALL altitude 
callouts (85%), there were no approaches for either system for 
which no altitude callouts were made. Neither system was 100% 
reliable in making altitude callouts since both the PNFand SYN-
CALL gave priority to calling deviations when faced with ~ demand 
for simultaneous altitude and deviation callouts. Furthermore, 
the reliability of normal altitude callouts made on the line 
(33" was nearly equal to that of SYNC ALL (35%) when the line 
callout reliability was adjusted to account for the high percen-
tage of visual approaches on the line. Since both systems 
resulted in high reliability for altitude callouts, it is diffi-
cult to attribute any flight performance differences to any 
differences in the altitude callout component of SYNCALL versus 
PNF. Rather than introduce automatic normal altitude callouts 
when no particular benefit to flight performance would be expect-
ed, altitude callouts by SYNCALL if implemented at all ought to 
be designed as a back-up - i.e. SYNC ALL should make them only if 
the PNF is unable to make them or forgets to make them for some 
reason. It must be noted, however, that the pilots actually 
favored altitude callouts by SYNCALL more than they did SYNCALL 
deviation callouts. The discussion of deviation callouts, cal-
lout timing and repetition logic, and tolerance values below may 
shed some light on this apparent discrepancy. 
2) ~~ ~Ltion callouL~ SYNCALL was more reliable than 
PNF for these callouts. 
3) deviatior), callouts SYNCALL was more reliable than PNF in 
calling out deviations in airspeed, sink rate, localizer posi-
tion, and glideslope position: SYNC ALL 90%, PNF 49%, where in-
stances of deviations requiring callouts were counted rather than 
number of callouts since a gi~en deviation could conceivably 
result in multiple callouts. This difference between the perfor-
mance of the two callout systems, then, suggests that the devia-
tion callout component of SYNCALL was important to the observed 
i~provement in flight performance with SYNCALL. 
4) critical altitude callou~ A direct comparison of the two 
callout systems for this component is not possible because these 
callouts are required only if the PF has not announced that the 
runway is in sight by the time the critical altitude (DH or MDA) 
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is reached. SYNCALL could not detect whether this was the case, 
so it always called the critical altitudes. Thus a,comparison 
between PNF and SYNC ALL for critical callout reliability is not 
meaningful. 
5) priority logi~ SYNC ALL was designed with different priori-
ties assigned to different types of callouts to cover situations 
when more than one callout was triggered. The criteria used for 
this priority assignment were 1) Make the most time-critical cal-
lout first, and 2) Make only less time-critical callouts after-
wards only if they still apply. 
Decision height and MDA were judged prior to the experiment 
to be the most time-critical of all the callouts since the 
pilot-flying must act immediately on the information conveyed by 
-these callouts so as not to compromise the safety of the approach 
by descending below minimums when this is not warranted. 
The next highest priority was assigned to deviation callouts; 
and the deviation parameters were ordered within this from higher 
to lower priority as glideslope, indicated airspeed, sink rate, 
and localizer. 
Lowest priority was given to ~ormal altitude callouts and 
normal position callouts. Since these by definition were not ex-
pected to occur simultaneously, no priorities within these were 
assigned. In fact, on rare occasions localizer intercept, 
glideslope intercept, and/or outer marker passage occur simul-
taneously. 
This priority logic had an effect on the reliabilty of dif-
ferent types of callouts made by SYNCALL. The most reliable were 
the DR and MDA callouts (100~). Next in reliability were devia-
tion callouts (90%). Lowest in reliability for SYNCALL were al-
titude callouts (83~). The callouts that SYNCALL made most reli-
ably were the ones that were given the highest priority when the 
system was designed. It is noteworthy that even SYNCALL, which 
presumably ~~ect~ 100% of all the callouts that should have 
been made, did not have time to speak all the callouts in cases 
where critical altitude and deviation callouts were required. 
We have only anecdotal evidence regarding the priority system 
used by the PNF to decide which of several simultaneously re-
quired callouts to make. Very likely it is much more complex 
than the unidimensional one employed by the SYNC ALL system. It 
probably takes into account a wide range of real world contextual 
factors such as the type of approach being made, the type of ter-
rain under the approach path, the weather, the wind conditio~s 
(above and beyond considerations made in computing the approach 
speed), whether or not the runway is in sight, and the amount of 
excursion beyond tolerance when deciding between multiple devia-
tion callouts. Also, the PNF knows that deviations in certain 
parameters are associated with deviations in other parameters and 
that correcting one may effectively correct the other. Excessive 
airspeed and excessive sink rate exemplify this type of associa-
tion. If one is present, the other may also be present, espe-
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cially on non-precision approaches. Whether the PNF calls 
airspeed or sink rate first will depend, then, on many factors. 
We cannot hope to duplicate the human's priority system so SYN-
CALL will function as the PNF does because we do not have all the 
informatio~, properly weighted, that the PNF brings to the situa-
tion. 
However, it was possible to observe, both on the flight deck 
and in the simulator, some general patterns of PNF behavior when 
confronted with the requirement simultaneous callouts. By noting 
what callouts the PNF made in these situations and when he made 
them, we can infer something about his priority system. 
Tne PNF employed a different timing strategy than SYNCALL for 
integrating altitude callouts and deviation callouts. Often a 
PNF deviation callout was made immediately after a 100-foot cal-
lout, presuillably to ensure that the 100-foot callout was made on 
time." SYNCALL, in contrast, called out a deviation as soon as it 
was detected and postponed any 100-foot callouts that were re-
quir~d during ennunciation of the deviation callout. Further, 
such an altitude callout was skipped entirely if the postponement" 
would nave caused it to be spoken more than 50 feet late. Had 
SYNCALL employed the strategy used by the PNF, it might have been 
more reliable for normal altitude callouts with no detriment to 
deviation callout reliability. Tnis would have been at the ex~ 
pense of SYNCALL's deviation callout timeliness, however. 
6) callout timing ~~q repeLition JL~~ Callout timeliness is 
closely linked to callout timing and repetition logic. The PNF 
strategy seems to be to wait for 100-foot altitude intervals and 
to callout any deviations at these times, just after making a 
100-foot callout. SYNCALL, on the other hand, called a deviation 
as soon as it detected one and checked again in 5 s. Assuming a 
700 FPM rate of descent, the 5-s interval would be the same as 
checkin~ every 58 feet or about twice the rate of the PNF in 
terms of altitude loss. For a 1200 FPM rate of descent, which 
would trigger a SYNCALL sink rate deviation callout, the altitude 
loss between SYNCALL repetitions would be 100 feet, the same as 
for PNF callouts. Thus, only when sink rate itself was exces-
sively high was the repetition rate by SYNCALL equivalent to that 
of PNF. Otherwise, SYNCALL made deviation callout repetitions 
for glideslope and airspeed twice as often as the PNF would have 
done. The approximately double repetition rate of SYNCALL devia-
tion callouts compared to PNF callouts is a second difference 
between the two systems ihat could have caused the observed 
flig~t performance difference in airspeed and sink rate for the 
non-precision approaches. Whether increased deviation callout 
reliability or increased callout repetiton rate or some combina-
tion of these produced the improvement in flight performance with 
SYNCALL cannot be determined from the data since the two factors 
are confounded. The pilots did judge the system to have an unac-
ceptably high rate of nuisance deviation callouts. If a syn-
thesized voice approach callout system were to be designed for 
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further testing, serious consideration should be given to ways of 
reducing deviation callout repetition rates to a level that would 
not be judged a nuisance by the pilots. Nuisance callouts could 
also be reduced by changing the decision logic for triggering re-
petitions of a callout for the same deviation. Pilots commented 
that if they saw that the pilot-flying was in the process of 
correcting ,a deviation, they did not repeat it even if the actual 
value was still outside tolerance. Only if they observed no 
change in deviation or an increased deviation did they say they 
would call it again. The SYNCALL localizer and glideslope devia-
tion callout repetition logic was in fact designed in exa6tly 
this way. The logic for the airspeed and sink rate deviation 
callouts was not. That is, SYNCALL made a repetition of the de-
viation after 5 s if the value was still outside tolerance re-
gardless of whether the pilot was in the process of correcting or 
not. In addition to changing the rate of deviation callout re-
petitions, or perhaps instead of changing this rate, a greater 
reduction in nuisance callouts might be achieved by making the 
logic for airspeed and sink rate deviation callouts be the same 
as that used for the localizer and glideslope deviation callouts 
and that which the pilots report they use: repeat the deviation 
callout only if no correction is being made. This approach to 
reducing nuisance callouts would also be consistent with the 
finding that pilots were satisfied with the repetition rates for 
each type of deviation callout and yet wanted a reduction in nui-
sance callouts. 
The timeliness of SYNCALL's initial deviation callouts, how-
ever, could have been one of the major contributing factors to 
the improved flight performance with SYNCALL in that deviations 
un-noticed by the Pilot-Flying were brought to his attention im-
mediately rather than at the next 100-foot interval of descent. 
Again, the data do not permit direct inference of this conclu-
sion, but serious consideration should be given to preserving 
this aspect of SYNCALL if future systems are designed for test-
ing. 
7) tolerance values SYNCALL was designed with tolerance 
values that were 25% to 33% greater than the "book" values used 
by the PNF. This was done in hopes of ensuring that the PNF 
would continue to watch for and callout observed deviations even 
when SYNC ALL was in use. Instead, the effect of SYNCALL on PNF 
deviation callout reliability was to reduce it from 49% to 24%. 
This suggests a potential problem, that of the PNF relying too 
heavily on SYNCALL to monitor for and make deviation callouts. 
Perhaps still larger differences between SYNC ALL and PNF "book" 
tolerances would have relegated SYNCALL to more of a back-up 
role. One would want to see PNF deviation callout reliability at 
least as good with SYNCALL as without SYNCALL in order to be cer-
tain that SYNCALL was not creating a new problem by its introduc-
tion. According to the pilot judgment data, the SYNCALL toler-
ances, particularly for airspeed, may indeed have been too tight. 
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A future system might be designed with the airspeed tolerances 
suggested by the pilots: +10 KTS and -5 KTS. 
Summary Qf Recommended Changes ~ SYNCALk 
On the basis of the analysis of the possible contributions of the 
different components of SYNCALL to the observed improvements in 
flight performance and in callout reliability, and to the ratings 
and suggested modifications by the pilots, a tentative SYNCALL 
system for further testing can be proposed. The system would 
make deviation callouts in airspeed, glideslope, localizer, and 
sink rate using the same tolerances for all but airspeed. The 
airspeed tolerance would be changed to +10 KTS and -5 KTS from V 
(APPR). This would give the following tolerances: 
GLIDESLOPE 
AIRSPEED 
SINK RATE 
2000 -1000 AFL 
1000 - 300 AFL 
BELOW 300 AFL 
LOCALIZER 
+1- 1 113 DOTS 
V(APPR) +10,-5 KTS 
2500 FPH 
1200 FPH 
1000 FPH 
+1-.1/2 DOT 
In addition, consideration should be given to including a 
callout and associate~tolerance for VOR course tracking and for 
Back Course Localizer course tracking. One could use the values 
suggested by one of the participating pilots as starting points. 
These were 1 1/2 dots for a Localizer Back Course and 2 dots for 
a VOR radial as final approach course. 
It will be remembered that for the experiment the functions 
of the GPWS were incorporated into the SYNCALL system on a non-
duplicating basis. Any future SYNC ALL system ought to include 
the excessive terrain closure warning of the GPWS for consisten-
cy. While not used in this study, the "Sink on Take-off" func-
tional warning of the GPWS would presumably also be incorporated 
into a modified SYNCALL system. The other GPWS modes, which all 
are designed to pertain to sink rate and glideslope in various 
aircraft configurations would be unnecessary because the informa-
tion they are designed to convey and some additional information 
as well, e.g. actual sink rate values, aircraft above glideslope, 
is given by SYNCALL. In support of this merging of GPWS with 
SYNCALL there is the semantic differential data which indicates 
that the pilotL ~ound SYNCALL to be more informative, more help-
ful, more dependable, and more coordinating that either the GPWS 
Whoop Whoop Pull Up or the GPWS Glideslope message. Also, one of 
the 31 modifications suggested by the pilots was "Eliminate GPWS 
and Replace with SYNCALL". This item r~ceived a mean rating of 
2.15 +1- 0.90 and a median response of 2 (desirable). 
Merging SYNCALL and GPWS warning functions would provide the pi-
lot with more information, and in particular would state the 
problem and the degree of the problem. It can be suggested but 
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not tested after the fact that such a system in place of the GPWS 
system could have alerted the crew of a 727 that accidentally 
landed sho~t due to unintentional excessive sink rate on an over-
water approach despite the t~iggering of a Whoop Whoop Pull Up 
message from the GPWS. ·(6) 9 
The repetition logic for the proposed SYNCALL system should 
have the feature used by the PNF and by the experimental SYNC ALL 
system for glideslope and localizer deviation callouts; once a 
deviation has been called, it should not be called again unless 
the deviation is not being corrected. The time interval of 5 s 
before a recheck of airspeed, glideslope, or sink and 10 s before 
a recheck of localizer deviation would be expected to work well 
provided this change of logic is implemented. 
The priority assignment of the different deviations was, 
from highest to lowest, GPWS Terrain Closure, Glideslope, 
Airspeed, Sink Rate, and Localizer. Some of the pilots and two 
of the instructor pilots suggested that Sink Rate deviations 
should be given higher priority than Airspeed deviations. They 
thought this would be especially useful for the non-precision ap-
proaches, for which glide path information is not available. An 
experimental comparison of these two priority assign~ents will 
have to be made using precision and non-precision approaches and 
measuring flight performance, callout reliability, callout timel-
iness, and pilot ratings before one can be chosen over the other. 
Such an experiment should include more extreme conditions of 
wind, gusts, and wind direction and velocity changes (wind sheer) 
than was possible in this study. 
Once a particular type of deviation had been called, the next 
highest priority parameter should be checked before the first is 
checked again. Without this provision, a SYNC ALL system could 
conceivably call one type of deviation while ignoring others un-
til that deviation was corrected. 
The proposed SYNC ALL system would not make normal altitude 
callout~. PNF callout reliability both in the experiment and on 
the line was, for all practical purposes, equal to that of SYN-
CALL for normal altitude callouts. Looked at the other way, SYN-
CALL was unable to improve on the performance of the pilot-not-
flying for normal altitude callout reliability; in part this was 
9. The GPWS in this accident was of the type that was designed 
to callout "Whoop Whoop, Pull Up" for any of four different 
problems: excessive terrain closure, excessive sink rate, sinking 
on take-off, and flaps or landing gear not in landing configura-
tion. Newer models of this system have been designed to state 
the actual problem that triggered the warning, partially conform-
ing to the suggestion here to merge GPWS and SYNCALL design 
features. One can also hypothesize that for the accident refer-
enced above, the use of this other type of GPWS might have 
prevented the accident. 
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because SYNCALL placed higher priority than did the PNF on cal-
lin3 out deviations as soon as detected, often to the detriment 
of SYNCALL normal callout reliability. There exist, however, 
rare instances when normal altitude callouts by SYNCALL could ac-
tually perform the warnin3 function served by the deviation cal-
louts. If for any reason, the crew is not aware of descent to 
low altitude and the PNF for that reason does not make the normal 
altitude callouts, SYNCALL could alert them to this by calling 
out altitudes only on these rare occasions. This could be 
designed into SYNCALL by having it automatically armed at the 
start of each ap~roach to make warning altitude callouts as fol-
lows: 
Callout Wording 
BELOW 1000 FEET 
BELOW 500 ?EET 
BELOW 100 FEET 
AFL Altitude 
goo feet 
400 feet 
80 feet 
These warning altitude callouts would be made by SYNC ALL only if 
an abnormal descent in terms of sink rate was occurring. Abnor-
mal sin~ rate would be defined as either excessively high ~ ex-
cessively low sink rate. Appropriate values cannot be given 
here. As a starting point, one could use sink rate in excess of 
SYNCALL sinx rate deviation tolerances or sink rate less than 100 
FPM to cover unintentional gradual descents. It must be emphati-
cally stressed that this part of the proposed SYNCALL system is 
extremely tentative and is derived from general human factors 
design principles to avoid false alarms and not from the data 
collected and analyzed in this study. A far better way of ob-
taining sink rate values to use as activators for warning alti-
tude callouts by a SYNC ALL system would be to analyze sink rate 
histories from a large sample of different types of approaches 
that were terminated successfully and compare the resulting means 
and standard deviations to sink rate histories for approaches 
that resulted in controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). Unless a 
combination of values could be found that would virtually elim-
inate false alarms while virtually guaranteeing that all in-
stances of unintentional descent would be called out, such a 
feature should not be incorporated into an automatic approach 
callout system such as SYNCALL. 
The Ten-Foot normal altitude callouts deserve special men-
tion, however. Unlike the rest of the normal altitude callouts, 
SYNCALL was definitely more reliable than PNF for these callouts 
(100~ compared to 77%). Tnis was noted independently during and 
after the simulator session by some of the participating pilots. 
In some case, pilots said they felt they were late making ten-
foot callouts and that the other pilot made the ten-foot callouts 
late. Also, captains noted that despite a procedural requirement 
that they make ten-foot callouts as pilot-not-flying, that they 
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as pilot in command felt obliged to look outside the cockpit dur-
ing the flare and touchdown. 10 Interestingly, there were no 
differences in ten-foot callout reliability as a function of po-
sition flown. Rather, both captains and first officers simply 
were not as reliable as SYNCALL in making these callouts. Assum-
ing that the timing of SYNCALL ten-foot callouts could be made 
acceptable, such callouts could be an effective means of normal 
altitude information transfer at a point in the approach where 
SYNCALL would not be making deviation callouts. The timing of 
SYNCALL ten-foot callouts might be improved an algorithm utiliz-
ing sink rate to remove the inherent delay in the altitude cal-
lout. 
For purposes of design consistency and simplicity from the 
viewpoint of the user, SYNCALL should not make normal position 
callouts. Even though SYNCALL was more reliable than PNF for 
this type of callout, inclusion of such callouts in a SYNCALL 
system would possibly dilute the warning function of the ~ystem 
in that pilots would then not associate SYNCALL callouts strictly 
with warnings. Also, SYNCALL was not able to make normal posi-
tion callouts with 100% reliability. This might tend to lessen 
pilot confidence in the system. 
The question of critical altitude callouts (Decision Height, 
MDA, 100 above MDA) is difficult. On the one hand, these are 
warnings only if the pilot-flying does not have the runway in 
sight. If the pilot-flying has announced the runway in sight, 
then the decision height or MDA callout and Missed Approach Point 
(MAP) callout will not be needed. The latter would also be ex-
tremely difficult to design into a SYNCALL system unless there 
were access to Inertial Navigation system or RNAV system data. 
On the other hand, SYNCALL was much more reliable than PNF for 
these callouts (100% compared to 58%, 48% and 52% respectively 
for 100 above MDA, MDA, and Decision Height callouts by PNF). In 
those instances when the decision height callout serves its func-
tion and the pilot-not-flying (for monitored approaches) or 
pilot-flying (for standard approaches) initiates a go-around, it 
is critical that the callout be made in a timely and reliable 
fashion. Were a SYNCALL system to make decision height and MDA 
callouts in a more timely way than the PNF is able to do, it 
might be useful to have SYNCALL make such callouts for all ap-
proaches with the provision that approach procedures be modified 
to have the pilot-not-flying callout "Going Around" if SYNCALL 
says Decision Height and the Pilot-Flying has not announced the 
runway in sight. In the case of MDA, possibly giving the task of 
10. Sometime after completion of the experimental approaches 
for SYNCALL and following informal presentation of these comments 
to the flight training department of the participating airline, 
the airline's procedures were modified to permit the captain as 
pilot-not-flying at his discretion to omit the ten-foot callouts. 
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calling out MDA to SYNCALL could make the task of monitoring for 
the MAP easier for the PNF. This entire discussion of Critical 
altitude callouts by SYNC ALL and possible changes to approach 
procedures is presented here to stimulate further thought on the 
question and not to advise for or against implementation of crit-
ical altitude callouts in any future SYNCALL systems for testing. 
SummarV·QL Proposed Modifications ~ SYNCAk~ 
To summarize, it is suggested on the basis of the findings 
from this study that SYNCALL be re-configured essentially as an 
approach warning callout system and be merged with the GPWS as 
one entire system. For the system to be effective, the recommen-
dations to eliminate nuisance alarms will have to be followed. 
Also the repetition logic will have to be changed. Finally, on 
the basis of the detrimental effects observed due to inappropri-
ate airspeed deviation callouts during the single-engine ap-
proach, no inappropriate deviation or other warning callouts can 
be tolerated. If these cannot be designed out of the system, or 
at best designed with a pilot-selectable deactivation switch, 
then they should not be included as part of it at all. The 
resulting system will then have to be tested in a flight simula-
tion study similar in comprehensiveness of systems and approach 
environment to that used for this study. 
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ALTITUDE AND APPROACH CALLOUTS BY SPEECH SYNTHESIZER 
Carol.A. Simpson, NRC Associate 
NASA Ames Research Center 
In preparation for a flight simulation study of synthesized speech 
Approach Callouts in an American Airlines DC-10 flight training Simulator, 
phoneme codes for the r'IL-l Speech Synthes ize·rl .lere programmed to de-
velop a Vocabulary of words and short phrases that .could be appropriate-
I 
ly concantenated to produce all of the required callouts including 
readout of actual altitude, airspeed, and rate of sink. Callout 
messages composed from this Vocabulary were then tested for intelli-
gibility. 
In order to maximize the chances for misunderstanding of any messages 
that might be of low intelligibility, the testing conditions were 
chosen so as to be more difficult than any of the conditions that were 
expected to actually occur in the flight simulator. Backe;round 
noise shaped to simulate DC-10 cockpit noise was presented at a 
level 10 db above the level of the loudest speech see;ment in the 
Approach Callout messages. The airline pilots who attempted to 
understand the callouts were given no prior exposure to the callouts 
and were told only that the messages they would hear were similar 
to the callouts made durine; the approach by the pilot-not-flying. 
The pilots repres~nted several different airlines and thus were 
not necessarily familiar with the particular set of callouts or 
the phraseology used in this study. The results are presented in 
outline form on page 3. The mean articulation score of 90.4% correct 
under these extremely difficult testing conditions indicates that 
this set of cullont rneGsuGcG is very. intelliGible and sUSGests that 
these messaGcs would be acceptable for use in the flight simulator. 
lManufactured by Vocal Interface Division, Federal Screw Works, Troy, 
Michie;an 
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As a further test of the individual words used to compose altitude callouts, 
a separate study was conducted with messuGes consisting entirely 
of altitudes ranging from Flight Level 440 to 10 feet radio altimeter. 
Two pronunciations of the digits for the altitude callouts were tested, 
a "phonetic" pronunciation and a "nonnal" pronunciation. In addition, 
pilots were asked to give their preferences for type of pronunciation 
and also for altitude phraseology, e.g. one three thousand versus 
thirteen thousand for 13000. These results are presented on pages 
4 and 5. The high articulation scores of 94.7 to 100% correct 
at a siN of -10 db also suggest that these individual words are highly • 
intelligible and adequate for use in the simulator. No significant 
difference in intelligibility was obtained for the two types of pronunciation. 
A majority of the pilots, however, preferred the "normal" pronunciation 
over the "phonetic" pronunciation, e~{Cert for the d:ic,it (), which a 
IIJ.::l.jority of pJ.lots JJreferred. to jJavc ·pronounced as "niner". Therefore, 
it is recommended that "normal" pronunciation be used for all digits 
except "niner". For altitude phraseology, nearly all pilots tested 
preferred the standard ATC phraseology, e.g. one three thousand for 
13000 and one three hundred for 1300. It is therefore recommended that 
the synthesizer follow ATC phraseology rules in making altitude 
callouts. 
Finally, pilot preferences for speech rate, voice pitch, and signal-to-
noise ratio for this synthesizer were obtained. These results are presented 
on page 6. In general, pilots preferred a voice pitch in the 
middle of the male voice pitch range with no significant differences 
in voice pitch or speech rate as a function of presence or absence 
of cockpit noise. The mean preferred signal-to-noise ratio was -1-").J1 db. 
It should be noted that the standard deviation of these preferences 
was quite large, 7.6 db. In order to accomorlate those pilots requiring 
a hf.gh s:ienul-to-nojse :r:ntjo, :it is recommended thut the callouts 
be presented at u s.ignnl-to-noise ratio of 8 db, slightly less than 
the mean + 1 standard deviation. 
-A 2-
Approach Callouts at siN = -lOdb: Intelligibility in DC-IO cockpit noise 
stimuli: Standard American Airlines DC-IO Approach Callouts pre-
sented over headphones with simulated DC-IO cockpit noise 
as background; SiN = -10 db. Each Callout presented 
once only. No prior familiarization with the messages. 
Subjects: 7 Airline pilots 
Results: 
Percent Word Articulation for 27 callouts containing a 
.. total of 97 words 
Pilot Number Age Word Articulation = Percent Correct 
1 31 90.7 
2 34 95.9 
3 43 88.7 
4 33 100.0 
5 39 89.7 
6 37 88.7 
7 42 79.4 
Mean 37 90.4 
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Phonetic versus Normal Pronunciation: Intelligibility Comparison 
stimuli: Altitude readouts ranging from 10 feet to Flight Level 1+40 
presented over headphones with simulated DC-IO cockpit noise 
as background; siN = -lOdb. 
Subjects: 5 airline pilots 
Test ~terial: The "Phonetic" and "Normal" sets contained identical 
altitudes and differed only in the pronunciation of the digits 
3, 4, and 5. The digit 9 was pronounced "niner" in both sets. 
R~sults: 
Digit 
3 
4 
5 
o 
-' 
Phonetic Pronunciation 
tree LtriJ 
fower [fowL~] 
fife [fajfJ 
niner [najnc;] 
Normal Pronunciation 
three [Gri] 
four (f1':::-] 
five [fajv] 
nine [najnJ] 
Percent Word Articulation for 2 sets of 24 altitudes containing 
a total of 171 words 
Pilot Number "Phonet:;c Pron!mciation" "Normal Prol1'mciation" 
Set 1 Set 2 Set 1 Set 2 
1 96 .6 100.0 100.0 97.7 
2 94.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
4 83.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 
5 100.0 100.0 98.8 100.0 
Mean 94.7 100.0 99.8 99.5 
Analysis: There was no significant difference in aritculation scores 
for the two types of pronunciation. 
* All data were obtained using a VOTRAX ~rrJ-l voice synthesizer, manufactured 
by Vocal Interface DiVision, Federal Screw Works, Troy, Michigan 
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"Airline P1lot Preferences for Pronunciation of Altitude Readouts 
Subjects: 12 airline pilots 
Results: 
Digit Phonetic Pronunciation Normal Pronunciation Either One OK 
3 1 10 1 
4 3 8 1 
5 3 9 0 
9 8 2 2 
Altitude A'ro Phraseology+ Common Phraseology + Either One 
13000 11 1 0 
1300 12 0 0 
Numbers are number of pilots responding in each category 
Conclusion: A majority of airline pilots prefer normal pronunciation for 
the digits 3, 4, and 5 and phonetiC pronunciation of the 
digit 9 as niner. They prefer the standard A'ro phraseology 
for altitudes-over the Common phraseology, e.g. one three 
thousand over thirteen thousand and one thousand three hundred 
over thirteen hundred. 
+ ATC Phraseology = one three thousand and one thousand three hundred 
Normal. Phraseology ~ thirteen thousand and thirteen hundred 
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OK 
Airline Pilot Preferences for speech rate, voice pitch, and signal-
to-noise ratio for the VotraxML-l Speech Gynthesizer 
stimuli: Synthesized Altitude and J\ppr08ch Callout r.Iessagcs presented 
over headphones ,\-lith and without simulated DC-IO cockpit noise as 
background. 
GUIJ.iects: CornmercJal airline pilots 
Procedure: For speech rate and voice pitch preferences, each pilot 
adjusted the appropriate knobs (continuous analog adjustment) first 
with no noise, then with background noise while listening to the 
Callout messau,es repeated 10 times each. For sir;ml-to-noise 
preferences, pilots told experimentor to adjust the. message level 
up or down until satisfied "lith the level of the messages relative to 
the noise level. Experimentor made adjustments in 10, 5, and 1 db 
units using a calibrated attenuator. 
Results: 
Mean Stand. nev. 
Iillob Setting Measured Freq. Kb st. F .". N 
Rate 5.7 ~ 1.1 13 
No Noise 
Pitch 5.3 91 Hz :t 1.0 +9 Hz 13 
-8 Hz 
With DC-IO Rate 5.6 ± 1.3 13 
Cockpit 
+7 Hz Noise Pitch 5.6 92 Hz ± 0.5 13 
-3 Hz 
siN +3 .l~ db ± 7.6 db 9 
* Note: The relatlonship between units marked on the pitch control 
knob of the VOTRJ\X and the resulting fundamental frequency of the 
synthesized voice is nonlinear. 
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VOCABULARY OF HORDG AND PHRf\SES US:rn TO GENERI\TE APPROACH CALLOUTS 
Item Number 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
II. 
12. 
13. 
11+. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
2l. 
22. 
23. 
2h. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
Vocabuary Item 
zero. 
one 
tvlO 
three. 
four 
five 
sty. 
seven 
eight 
niner 
ten 
eleven 
twelve 
thirteen 
fourteen 
fifteen 
sixteen 
seventeen 
eie;hteen 
nineteen 
hundred 
thousand 
twenty 
thirty 
forty 
fifty 
~ixty 
seventy 
eir;hty 
ninety 
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Item Number 
31. 
32. 
33. 
31~ • 
35. 
36 • 
37. 
38. 
39. 
~o. 
41. 
1~2 • 
Ii3. 
41~ • 
45. 
~6. 
h7. 
48. 
h9. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
·53. 
54. 
55. 
VOC!lBUTAHY ITEr;![) (cont.) 
Vocabulary Itr-.:m 
Flight Lc"rcl 
1<13L 
Above Field 
feet 
minus 
plus 
/messagc-initial pause/ 
/phrase or message-final pause/ 
Rate of climb is 
You're above thc glidcslope. 
You're beloH the glideslope. 
You are right of the localizer. 
You are left of the localizer. 
and 
Whoop Hhoop! Pull Up! 
Passing through 18000. 
Leaving 11000. 
Glideslope intercept. 
Localizer lntcrcept. 
Outer Marker 
Decision Height 
100 feet above r-IDA. 
Sink is 
J.1DA 
Airspeed 
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APPENDIX B 
Flight Scenario for One of Four Experimental Orders 
Captain: A. Takeoff 
B. ATC Departure 
C. Holding and/or Steep Turns and/or Stalls 
(Instructor Pilot's discretion) 
D. Vectors for Approach 
1. (SYNCALL) Backcourse 5R (10 KTS cross-wind) 
with complete missed approach. 
Vectors or reset to: 
2. (SYNCALL) ILS DUAL LAND approach and landing 
(10 KTS cross-wind) 
E. Takeoff Engine Failure between V1 and V2 (no wind) 
Vectors or reset to: 
3. (SYNCALL) Two-engine ILS to 100 feet (10 KTS 
. quartering wind) and ~issed approach. 
Vectors or reset to: 
F. Two-engine landing. 
F/O: G. Takeoff 
H. ATC Departure 
I. Holding and/or Steep Turns and/or Stalls 
(Instructor Pilot's discretion) 
J. Vectors for Approach 
1. (SYNCALL) Backcourse 5R (10 KTS crosswind) 
with complete missed approach. 
Vectors or reset to: 
2. (SYNCALL) Coupled ILS APPCH ONLY and land 
(no wind) 
K. Takeoff engine Failure between V1 and V2 (no wind) 
Vectors or reset to: 
3. (SYNCALL) Two-Engine ILS to 200 feet and land 
(10 KTS quatering wind) 
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L. Takeoff and vectoring for approaches 
Captain: 4. (PLTNFLY) VOR to 7L/R using Raw Data with 
rejected landing at 10 feet.(10 KTS 
crosswind) Vectors or reset to: 
5. (PLTNFLY) ILS DUAL LAND to SINGL LAND to go-
around (10 :<TS ',-lind) Vectors or reset 
to: 
FlO: 4. (PLTNFLY) vaR to L/R using Raw Data with 
rejected landing at 10 feet. (10 KTS 
crosswind) Vectors or reset to: 
5. (PLTNFLY) ILS DUAL LAND to SINGL LAND to 
APPCH ONLY and go-around(10 KTS wind) 
Captain: M. Engine Failure or shutdown, then: 
N. Engine Fire, the Vectors or reset to: 
6. (PLTNFLY) One-Engine Landing (VFR and no wind) 
Notes: SYNCALL = Synthesized Voice Approach C~llout System 
PLTNFLY = Pilot Not Flying Callout System 
The above scenario shows the assigment of pilot-flying 
and callout system used to Presentation Order 1. 
Presentation Orders 2, 3, and 4 were derived by altering 
the pilot to fly first (Captain or First Officer) and 
the callout system to be used. first (SYNCALL or PLTNFLY) 
The order of the approaches flown: (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) 
was constant for all Presentation Orders in accordance 
with American Airlines' recurrent training syllabus. 
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PILOT EVALUATION OF APPROACH CALLOUT SYSTEMS 
The speech synthesizer was programmed to make all of the altitude and 
deviation approach callouts. This was done to give you a chance to 
experience the range bf capability of such a system. In your own pro-
fessional judgment, certain types of callouts, either by the speech 
synthesizer or by the pilot-nat-flying, may be more or less desireable. 
The next two pages contain "preference grids". The different types of 
callouts are listed down the side - first for SYNCALL, the speech 
synthesizer, then (on the next page) for the PILOT-NaT-FLYING. Also 
4 different types of approach conditions are listed across the top 
of each preference grid: 
1) Night VFR 2) Abnormal or 
Emergency 
3) Day VFR 4) IFR to 
r~inimums 
Starting with the grid for SYNCALL, put a check in the appropriate box 
for each type of callout that you think would be useful and desireab1e 
for the type of approach listed. Do this for each type of approach 
condition. Then repeat the process for the PILOT-NaT-FLYING grid. 
Check as many or as few ca110uts for each type of approach condition 
and system as you want. If you want no ca110uts for a particular, type 
of approach and system, check the lowest box, "none". 
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SYNCALL 
---. I I~R_ , Night VFR Abnormal/! Day VP'R to I Emergency! m~n~mums ! 
I 
Glideslope Intercept ! j 1 
I . 
. 
Localizer Intercept ! I 
: ~ 
. ; 
OM and Altitude AFL I 
. 1 _ .... _._ .... - I ~ 
--
1000 Feet AFL i I I , 
-
100 Feet Above HDA I I , 
.......... i I MDA i • I 
-. , ----' .. ~.--
I i Decision Height ! I I I I 
! i ~ 500 Airspeed I Feet, & : ! Sink Rate • I j 
FrunorecrFOotCalToutsi. 
-_. 
I 
I 
I 
Ten foot Callouts ! 1 i l 
G/S Deviations ! I I I 
LOC Deviations I 
..,. 
Sink Rate Deviations f 
-
Airspeed Deviations 
---_._-
-
>--._-----
J.'{one (no ~llouts) .L~ 
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PILOT-NOT-FLYING 
Night VFR IFR to 
• 
VFR!Abnormal/! Day I Emergencyl minimu.rns i 
Glideslope Intercept I I 
i 1 ~-----------'-.----------.-+-------------;--------~------------~------~ Locatizer Intercept i I 
OM and Altitude AFL 
--
t 
1000 Feet AFL ! 
100 
j 
Feet Above HDA ! 
I 
MDA ! I 
Decision Height I I , 
500 Feet, Airspeed & I 
Sink Rate I 
Hundrea-FOot Ca [louts! 
Ten Foot Callouts 
~-
I 
! 
-
I I I 
____________________ .4 ____________________ ~--------~--------~ 
G/S Deviatioris 
LOC Deviations 
Sink Rate Deviations 
Airspeed Deviations 
f------------.--oof--.----+--------l------I--------i i.'ione (no ca llouts )_ I 
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Assume for the moment that the PILOT-NOT-FLYING callouts were modified 
to be exactly the waf you s~ecified in the preference grid, Rate your 
system on the 10110w n9 sea e by plAcing an "X" in the ~ppropr1ate space, 
unsafe no 
preference 
, 
, 
--- h .... i-.gh ..... ,-y-
des1reable 
Now assume for the moment 'that SYNCALL were implemented exactly the ~ 
you specified in the preference grid, Rate your system on the scalelOelow. 
. , 
-un-s-a""fe-- -------- -no---· ... · -------'highly 
preference' desireable 
Now assume t~~ PILOT-NOT-FLYING callouts remain the same as they are now. 
Rate the current system of pilot-not-flying callouts on the scale below. 
unsafe no 
preference 
, 
---'highlY 
desireable 
Now assume. that the SYNCALL system were implemented exactly as you experienced 
it today in the simulator. Rate this system on the scale below, 
, 
--un~s--a"'ll'fe------' ----- no --------'highly 
preference desireable 
On the next four scales below, rate the intelligibili~ of the four types 
of speech which you just heard in the simulator. 
SYNCALL 
• 0% ' -..,--------' 50% 100% 
LA TRACON 
0% 50% 100% 
LAX TOWER 
" , 
0% 50% 100s 
PI LOT-NOT-FLYING 
as 50i 1001 
C 1\ 
If a SYNCAll system were installed in the cockpit, it might be desireab1e 
to build in some limits on the conditions for the different callouts. 
listed below are several technologically feasible constraints for such 
a system. Using the following scale, rate each suggestion by placing a 
1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 in front of it. 
1 Highly desireab1e 
2 Desireab1e 
3 No preference 
4 Undesireab1e 
5 Unsafe 
Deviation ca1louts not activated until 500 feet above field and 
-lower. 
_ Hundred Foot callouts activated only for coupled approaches. 
Hundred Foot call outs· can be deactivated by Captain at Captain's 
----- discretion for VFR approaches. 
_ Glideslope deviations can be deactivated at Captain's discretion 
for VFR approaches. 
(In the blank spaces, add any limits that you would want to impose 
on such a system and rate your suggestions with the same scale. 
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PILOT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MODIFICATION OF SYNCALL 
Introduction 
The tolerance windows for the SYNCALL deviation callouts were picked as "ball 
park" values so as to test the general concept of an automatic approach callout 
system. I figured the values might need changing once a group of line pilots 
had actually flown SYNCALL in the simulator. When you were flying SYNCALL. you 
may have thought the deviation callouts were made too frequently or maybe not 
often enough and that the allowances on airspeed. sink rate, glideslope. and 
localizer were either too loose or too tight to work well in the real world. 
I would like to get your recommendations for setting the tolerances for each 
type of deviation callout. And I would like to also get your recommendations 
for the priority assignments to each type of callout. Please answer each of 
the following questions based on your short experience with SYNCALL and on your 
extensive experience flying the line. And feel free to add comments ! 
If you have any questions about what I'm asking, please call me (collect) at 
NASA. When you call. just say that you were in the SYNCALL study. When you 
have finished filling this out you can use the stamped. self-addressed envelope 
to mail it back to me. 
Return to: 
Carol A. Simpson, PhD 
Hail Stop 239-2 
NASA Ames Research Center 
Moffett Field, CA 94025 
Call collect: 415/965-6128 
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1. SYNCALL tolerance "windows" 
The chart below shows the tolerance "windows" that were set for SYNCALL when you flew 
it in the simulator. In each case, the "window" is wider than the tolerances you have 
in your operating manual for the pilot-not-flying and the flight engineer to use when 
making deviation callouts. 
AIRSPEED Approach ("Bug") Speed + 7 KTS 
SINK RATE Bebteen 2000 and 1000 AFL 2500 fpm 
Between 1000 and 300 AFL 1200 fpm 
Below 300 AFL 1000 fpm 
LOCALIZER 1/2 dot 
GLIDESLOPE 1 and 1/3 dot 
In the chart below please fill in the values that ~ think SYNCALL should use. Note 
that for the airspeed you don't have to choose the same amount on the negative side 
as on the positive side. For example, you could choose -20 and +3. Keep in mind that 
you want to avoid nuisance callouts but that you want the system to tell you about any-
thing really dangerous. 
If you would not want SYNCALL to make a particular type of deviation callout at all, 
regardless of the size of the "window", please put a check in the box at the far right 
of the chart on the line corresponding to that type of callout. Note, for example, 
that you might want SYNCALL on sink rate for only some but not all the altitudes listed • 
TYPE OF CALLOUT 
AIRSPEED Approach ("Bug") Speed 
SINK RATE Between 2000 and 1000 AFL 
Between 1000 and 300 AFL 
Below 300 AFL 
LOCALIZER 
GLIDESLOPE 
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"WINDOW" 
./ IF DON'T WANT 
THIS TYPE CALLOUT 
2. Deviation callout repetition rates and "active" segments 
The chartbe10w shows the rates at which the different SYNCALL deviation ca1louts were 
repeated. For example, airspeed deviations were repeated once every 5 seconds as long 
as the aircraft remained outside the "window". The chart also shows the point in the 
approach where each callout became "active". At that point SYNCALL would start checking 
for that type of deviation. Before that SYNCALL would not make any callouts even if 
the aircraft was outside the "window". For example, SYNCAlL started checking for sink 
rate deviations at 600 feet AFL. Finally, the chart shows the point where SYNCALL was 
automatically "turned off" for each type of deviation so as to avoid distractions at 
low altitude. For example, SYNCALL stops checking for glides10pe deviations at 100 feet 
AFl. 
TYPE OF CALLOUT REPETITION RATE START CHECKING STOP CHECKING 
AIRSPEED 5 sec. 600 AFL 100 AFL 
SINK RATE 5 sec. 600 AFL 100 AFL 
LOCALIZER 10 sec. at LOC CAP 100 AFL 
GLIDESLOPE 5 sec. at GIS CAP 100 AFl 
In the chart below, please fill in the values that ~ think SYNCALL should use for 
repetition rate, start checking, and stop checking.~ on page 1, if you would not 
want SYNCALL to make a particular type of deviation callout at all, regardless of the 
repetition rate or the "active" segment, please put a check in ~he box at the far 
right side of the chart on the line corresponding to that type of callout. 
tI IF DON'T WANT 
TYPE OF CALLOUT REPETITION RATE START CHECKING STOP CHECKING THIS TYPE CALLOUT 
AIRSPEED 
SINK RATE 
LOCALIZER 
GLIDESLOPE 
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3. SYNCALL Priority System 
SYNCALL systematically missed certain callouts for certain approaches due to its priority 
system and the timing of the callouts. For example, on a VOR 7R Approach, MDA was 436 AFL. 
So SYNCALL called "100 feet above MDA" at 536 AFL and did not make the 500 AFL callout. 
If a deviation callout coincided with an altitude callout, SYNCALL made the deviation 
callout and skipped the altitude callout. The chart on the left lists the types of SYNCALL 
callouts. including the GPWS Whoop Whoop for Terrain (Mode 2), in their order of priority 
from highest to lowest. If you would want a different order of priorities, please list 
the types of call0uts in the order you would want in the chart in the middle. If there 
are any of these call0uts that you would not want SYNCALL to make at all, please list them 
in the chart to the right. If, on the other hand, you like the priorities the way they 
are. please check the box below the three charts. 
3: 
o 
.... 
.If 
Current Priorities 
DH or MDA 
GPWS Mode 2 (Terrain) 
G1ideslope Dev. 
Airspeed Dev. 
Sink Rate Dev. 
Localizer Dev. 
Altitude Ca110uts 
Your Recommended Priorities 
L:::J Leave Priorities as they are 
4. Suggested Modifications to SYNCALL 
SYNCALL should not 
make these ca110uts 
Listed below are all the suggestions given by one or more pilots who flew SYNCALL. Please 
consider each one and give it a rating using the scale at the top of the list. Put your 
rating for each suggestion on the line just to the left of that suggestion. For example, 
if you find a particular suggestion "highly desirable", put a "1" on the line next to the 
suggestion. If you find it "undesirable", then put a "4" beside it. Do this for each 
suggestion. After you finish, go back and pick out any and all of the suggestions that 
for you would be essential in order for you to be willing to accept SYNCALL - i.e. if 
SYNCALL were not modified according to these particular suggestions, then you would not 
want it in your airplane. _ 
Unsafe Undesirable 
5 4 
---------- ---
.. here if 
Essential 
Put your 
Rating here 
(1.2.3.4.5) 
Note that the list continues on the next page. 
RATING SCALE 
No Preference 
or Can't Oed de 
3 
Desirable Highly Desirable 
2 
-'-----------------------------------
SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS TO SYNCALL 
o __ Have ON/OFF switch in case of erroneous info or distracti on from SYNCALL 
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Suggested Modifications to SYNCALL continued. 
RATING SCALE 
unsafe undesirable no preference 
or can't dec1 de 
desirable highly desirable 
_. __ ~ __ . _____ ._~ _____________ ~. ______ . ________ 2 _ .. _________ ._ 
-----Put your 
V here if rating here 
essential (1,2,3.4,5) SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS TO SYNCALL 
CJ 
o 
CJ 
o 
o 
D 
CJ 
o 
D 
D 
0' 
CJ 
o 
C1 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
D 
o 
Provide Test switch for accuracy check 
Minimize frequency of deviation callouts 
Delay callouts during radio transmissions (if possible) 
Eliminate GPWS & replace with SYNCALL 
Add a warning in case airspeed gets below Alpha Speed 
Shorten message wording 
Speed up SYNCALL's speech rate 
Eliminate nuisance callouts 
Add other warnings, e.g. engine fire, loss of cabin pressure, etc. 
Add immediate action checklist jtems 
Provide manual volume control 
Increase volume 
Increase tolerance on localizer deviations 
Increase tolerance on glides lope deviations 
Increase tolerance on airspeed deviations 
Spell out SYNCAlL and pilot-not-flying responsibilities more clearly 
At the 50 ft callout, callout airspeed and sink. Then eliminate 
the 40, 30, 20, 10 callouts by SYNCALL 
Inhibit airspeed and sink rate deviation callouts during abnormal or 
emergency approaches 
Automatically change SYNCALL parameters depending on type of approach 
Call Localizer capture, then Localizer Intercept 
Read out Flight Guidance Mode Annunciators after LAND mode has 
been armed 
(continued on next page) 
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Suggested Modifications to SYNCAll continued -
RATING SCALE 
unsafe undesirable no preference 
or can't dec1 de 
desirable highly desirable 
5 4 3 2 
vlhere if Put your 
essential rating here (1,2,3,4,5) 
o 
o 
o 
o 
D 
o 
o 
CJ 
o 
Call out NBe10w MDA" if aircraft descends below MDA (unless pilot 
has pressed a "disab len switch) 
On non-precision approaches, give sink rate deviations top priority 
Obtain FAA & Company agreement not to use CVR recordings of SYNCAll 
against the crew 
Have SYNCAll call the flaps setting at 1000 AFl 
Have SYNCAll say "Check Flaps" at 1000 AFl 
Make voice quality for deviations more alerting compared to altitude calls 
Have SYNCALl make deviation callouts only (i.e." only if something's wrong) 
Have SYNCAll make altitude ca1louts only (leave deviations to pilot-not-
flying and flight engineer) 
If aircraft balloons on landing, have SYNCALL repeat 10-foot callouts 
as appropriate, e.g. "50, 40, 30, 20, 30, 20, 10" 
5. Background Data 
Please fill in the chart below 2Dlx for the type aircraft you were current in at the 
time that you flew SYNCALl 
TYPE AIRCRAFT POSITION FLOWN APPROX. NO. HOURS IN TYPE 
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I 
o 
........ 
I 
6. Preference Grids for desired callouts for different types of Approach Conditions 
The two preference grids below are like the ones you filled out after flying SYNCALL in the simulator. Please fill 
them out using the same instructions as before. That is, put a check in the appropriate box for each type of callout 
that you think would be useful and desirable for the type of approach listed. Do this for each of the four types of 
approach conditions. By~ng a box blank, you are saying you don't want that type of callout for that type of 
approach or that you are not sure_~hatyou would want it. Check the box only if you really would want SYNCALL to make 
that callout for that type of approach. ..... .. _ 
There are two preference grids. Fill outth~.one .. on_theJeft. assuming SYNCALL stayed the way it was when you flew it 
in the simulator. Then f111 out the one on the right assuming SYNCALL was changed according to your own recommendations 
on the preceeding pages of this evaluation. 
ust-liiis GRID FOR S'/IICAll THE VAY IT liAS IIIEII YOU FUll IT 1M TM£ SIIIJlATOR 
TYPO or ApI roltJI Q)ftGl 11 ans 
IIl&ht YrR Abnor.all Day VPI IB to 
Typo of tan ... t 
-laftCJI .lftlooln. 
OUd •• lop. Int ... cept 
LacaUz ... lnt ... .,.pt 
Q( and Altitud. An. 
1000 ' •• t AlL 
100 ' •• t AbOY. KIM 
HIlA. 
Dachlon H.lsht 
SOO ' •• t. A1repeed • 
SlnII lIat. 
1 .. _ .... _ 'uu, ..... vu,. 
ra. root c:allouto 
0/. O""latlon. 
I.OC D..,iatlon. 
SlIlk Ita te Dav1a tlon. 
Air.peed O""latlDn. 
~. (110 callouto) 
I 
IJS£llI1S ·GRIO FOR SYlICAll THE VAY 1T.IIOOlO 8E IF 11' VElIE CIWIG£b TIl[ VAY YOO HAVE 
RECOtODED 1M THIS EYAlUATlOII 
Typo of All_ell CDndltlOlls 
"l&ht YrR Abn_ll Day v,. IB to 
Typo ., Ca n ... t DI«S.,.". ~I.ouu 
Clllde.lop. lzotercept 
!.Dealt,.« lftt ... eept 
Q( and Altitud. ArL 
1000 h.t ArL 
100 'Ht Abov. KIM i 
HIlA. 
Dachlon H.lsbt 
500 'Ht, Air.p.ed • 
Slnk Rat. 
IIIUDC1Cea roo< <Auoun 
ten root c:a lloun 
Cl/s O""lation. 
I.OC Il..,latl!'n. 
Sink it&t. Il."lat~no 
Alz.p •• d Devl.clDn. 
)Ion. (no .,alloun) 
That's the end. Thank you very much. and I'll let you know how this all turns out. 
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